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Case No. 20100188-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

Robert Ferretti,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from the denial of a motion to withdraw his guilty plea to
murder, a first degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann.
§ 78A-4-lO3(2)0) (West 2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by rejecting Defendant's claim

that his plea was not knowing, where the record shows that Defendant knew he was
admitting to intentionally or knowingly killing the victim by shooting her in the
head?
Standard of Review. A trial court's ruling on a motion to withdraw a plea is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. See State v. Lovell, 2010 UT 48, ^ 5,661 Utah Adv.

Rep. 20. Findings of fact supporting the court's ruling are reviewed for clear error.
See id.

2.

Has Defendant proved that the trial court violated his rights to counsel

and due process by denying his continuance motion, where Defendant has not
shown how he was prejudiced by the court's ruling?
Standard of Review. This Court reviews a trial court's denial of a continuance
for abuse of discretion. State v. Torres-Garcia, 2006 UT App 45,110,131 P.3d 292
3.

Has Defendant proved that the prosecutor breached the plea

agreement, where Defendant's claim rests entirely on extra-record evidence?
Standard of Review. No standard of review applies to this issue because
Defendant did not raise it below.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, and court rules are
attached at Addendum A:
U.S. Const, amend. VI; U.S. Const, amend. XIV;
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (West Supp. 2008);
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (West Supp. 2010);
Utah R. Crim. P. 11.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 17,2009, Defendant was charged with one count each of murder, a
first degree felony, and obstructing justice, a second degree felony. R. 1-2. After a
preliminary hearing, Defendant was bound over as charged. R. 75-76. A jury trial
was set for January 11-15,2010. R. 85.
On January 11, 2010, the trial court accepted Defendant's guilty plea to the
murder charge as part of a plea bargain. R. 281-87, 288-96, 298. In exchange, the
State agreed to dismiss the obstructing justice charge; to write a letter to the parole
board asking it "to consider the Defendant's willingness to plead guilty to murder
as mitigation in considering his eventual release"; and to ask the trial court to make
the same recommendation to the parole board. R. 292. Sentencing was set for
February 10,2010. R. 298.
At sentencing, but before announcement of sentence, Defendant orally moved
to withdraw his plea, asserting that his plea may not have been knowingly entered.
R. 306. After reviewing the plea proceedings, the trial court denied the motion and
sentenced Defendant to fifteen years to life in prison. R. 306-07.
Defendant timely appealed. R. 310.

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The crime}

When Defendant and his friend, Robert Underwood, lived

together in Salt Lake City around 2005 or 2006, they would talk about taking
someone up to the mountains and shooting them "just to know if we could do it."
PSI at 20. But then Underwood moved back to Colorado. Id.
On November 3, 2008, Defendant picked up a former girlfriend, Tiffany
Jarmon, in Salt Lake City, and drove north on 1-15 in his Toyota 4-runner. PSI at 5,
8. Somewhere between Salt Lake City and Logan, Utah, Defendant fatally shot
Tiffany in the head. PSI at 8,21. He then dumped Tiffany's body "off the side of the
road down a steep embankment near the Logan River/' PSI at 4. Tiffany's body
was found by a passerby on November 8, 2008. PSI at 5.
After the murder, Defendant removed the front passenger seat from his 4Runner and sold the car to a junk yard. PSI at 6. When officers recovered the car,
they found Jarmon's blood throughout the front part of the car, particularly on the
passenger side door, floorboard, and glove compartment. PSI at 7.

Defendant has not included a transcript of the preliminary hearing in the
record on appeal. Thus, the facts of the crime are taken primarily from the
transcript of Defendant's plea hearing and from Defendant's presentence
investigation report.
4

Police questioned Defendant at his place of work about the murder, but did
not arrest him. PSI at 6. Shortly thereafter, Defendant fled the Salt Lake area. PSI
at 7.
In January 2009, Defendant called his friend, Robert Underwood, who was
still living in Colorado. PSI at 8, 20. After Underwood picked Defendant up,
Defendant told him that "he had did this" and "that it didn't bother him at all/' PSI
at 20-21. Defendant told Underwood "that he didn't make it to where he planned to
do it because the person would not shut up"; thus, Defendant told Underwood,
Defendant just shot her in the front seat of his car. PSI at 21. According to
Underwood, Defendant "said he laughed and said oh what ain't got anything to say
now." PSI at 21.
Underwood contacted the Cache County Sheriffs Office on March 12,2009, to
report the murder. PSI at 8,22. Defendant was arrested in Colorado on March 13,
2009, and returned to Utah on March 24, 2009. PSI at 8. While awaiting trial,
Defendant admitted to another inmate, Nathan Douros, that he shot Jarmon in his
car, that she was crying when he shot her, and that she "deserved to die because she
was a 'crack whore/"

PSI at 8. Defendant also told Douros that, after killing

Jarmon, he "drove to Logan and discarded the body in Logan Canyon." Id. Finally,

5

Defendant told Douros that he had told Underwood about the murder and "had
thoughts about killing Underwood/' Id.
Defendant's guilty plea. On the morning trial was set to begin, Defendant,
through counsel, announced that he had reached a plea agreement with the State, in
which Defendant would plead guilty to the murder charge in exchange for the
State's dismissal of the obstructing justice charge, a letter from the State to the board
of pardons, and a request from the State that the court also send a letter to the board
of pardons. R. 314:3,10; R. 288-96.
In connection with his plea, Defendant signed a Notice of Plea Bargain Rule
11 Waiver/Statement of Facts (Notice). R. 288-96 (attached at Addendum C).
Paragraph 1 of the Notice, which addressed the nature of Defendant's charges and
the elements of the offenses, defined the elements of murder: "on or about October
to November 2008, the defendant intentionally or knowingly ca[u]sed the death of
another, to wit, Tiffany B. Jarmon." R. 289. Paragraph 2 stated that, as part of the
agreement, Defendant would enter a guilty plea to murder. Id. Paragraph 3 stated:
"I understand that the elements of the above offense the State must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt are that I intentionally or knowingly caused the death ot another,
Tiffany Britt Jarmon." Id.

6

Paragraph 8 of the Notice set forth the rights Defendant would waive as a
result of his guilty plea, including that "[t]he government must prove each and
every element of the offense(s) charged against me beyond a reasonable doubt." R.
291. Paragraph 9 stated: "I understand that by pleading guilty there will be no trial
of any kind, and that I am admitting that I committed the crime as charged/' Id.
Paragraph 13 stated: "I know that under a plea of guilty the judge may ask me
questions about the offense, and that I will have to admit my participation in
committing the crime/' R. 292.
The Notice stated, as a factual basis for Defendant's plea, that:
1.
Sometime in the months of October to November, 2008,1
met with Tiffany Britt Jarmon. I had known Tiffany Britt Jarmon prior
to this date[;]
2.
That during this time I took the life of Tiffany Britt Jarmon.
I drove her to Cache County Utah, where I shot her in the head in my
car, taking her life. I then pushed her body down an embankment next
to the side of the road and fled.
R. 293.
Finally, the Notice stated: "I understand that I may request to withdraw my
guilty plea any time prior to sentencing or forfeit the right to do so. A motion to
withdraw a guilty plea will only be granted upon good cause and is within the
discretion of the Court." R. 293. The Notice also stated, "I have no mental
reservations concerning this plea." R. 294.
7

The Certificate of Attorney executed at the close of the Notice stated that
defense counsel had reviewed the Notice with Defendant and believed Defendant
"fully understands the meaning of its content." R. 295. Moreover, "[t]o the best of
my knowledge and belief..., the elements of the crime and the factual synopsis of
the Defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated." Id.
In connection with his plea, Defendant also completed a Statement of
Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea and Certificate of Counsel (Statement). R. 28896,281-287 (attached at Addendum D). The Statement stated that the elements of
the crime to which Defendant was pleading were "set forth in Count 1 of the
criminal information." R. 282. The Statement also stated that the factual basis for
the plea was "[a]s stated in court" and that those facts "prove the elements of the
crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty." Id. The Statement indicated that the full
extent of the State's agreement was that, in exchange for his plea, the State would
dismiss the obstructing justice charge. R. 294. Finally, the Statement stated: "I
understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty . . . plea(s), I must file a written
motion to withdraw my plea(s) within 30 days after I have been sentenced," that "I
will only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I show good cause," and that "I will not
be allowed to withdraw my plea after 30 days for any reason." R. 285.

8

At the plea hearing, the trial court reiterated — paragraph by paragraph—all
the information contained in the Notice of Plea Bargain Rule 11 Waiver/Statement
of Facts, confirming after each paragraph that Defendant understood the paragraph
just read. R. 314:3-11 (transcript attached at Addendum B). Thus, Defendant
confirmed to the court that he understood the elements of murder to be "that on or
about October to November of 2008, that the defendant, which is you, intentionally
or knowingly caused the death of another, to-wit: Tiffany Jarm[o]n." R. 314:4.
Defendant confirmed that he understood that, absent his plea, the State would have
to prove those elements beyond a reasonable doubt. R. 314:5-6, 8.

Defendant

confirmed that, by pleading guilty, he was "admitting that [he] committed the crime
as charged/' R. 314:9. Defendant confirmed the factual basis for his plea, as stated
in the Notice. R. 314:11. And Defendant confirmed that he understood that he
could "request to withdraw [his] guilty plea at any time prior to sentencing or forfeit
the right to do so," and that a motion to withdraw "would only be granted upon
good cause and is within the discretion of the Court." R. 314:12.
The court then directed Defendant's attention to the Statement he had
completed, noting that it "goes over the same things that [the court] just went over
with you on the record." R. 314:14. After Defendant stated that he was pleading
guilty to the murder charge, the trial court accepted Defendant's plea. R. 314:14-15.
9

The prosecutor thereafter provided additional facts supporting Defendant's
plea, including that "after having shot Tiffany Jarm[o]n in the head with a 9
millimeter handgun, the defendant, after disposing of her body, disposed or tried to
get rid of the evidence in this case and after pursuing that course of action, admitted
this incident to at least two other individuals."

R. 314:16. And Defendant

confirmed to the court that he was "entering [his] plea because those things actually
occurred." R. 314:17.
After setting a sentencing date, Defendant stated, "Your Honor, I would like
to say that I never intended initially for Ms. Jarm[o]n to die." R. 314:19. The court
then asked, "Did you knowingly and intentionally take her life, Mr. Ferretti?" R.
314:20. Defendant responded, "I have trouble saying yes, I did. I was under the
influence of drugs and alcohol at the time and we were in an argument." Id. The
court then stated:
Mr. Ferretti, I understand that, but by so stating and we've
already gone over all this, but I'm going to go over it again, in order for
me to accept your plea, I understand that you were under the influence
of drugs and alcohol, but when you committed the act that you did by
shooting her in the head, did you understand that that would be — that
you would be taking her life?
R. 314:20. Defendant responded, "Yes." Id. The court then stated, "All right. We'll
continue to accept your plea." Id.
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Defendanfs motion to withdraw his plea. As Defendant's sentencing hearing
opened, Defendant stated that he wanted to withdraw his guilty plea. R. 315:3
(transcript attached at Addendum E). The court instructed Defendant that his
desire "needs to be articulated, the reasons set forth in a motion," and then asked
defense counsel how much time he needed to file a motion. R. 315:4. Defense
counsel asked for two weeks because "I haven't researched the grounds for this
plea, your Honor." R. 315:4. However, counsel added, "given the fact that he has 30
days from the date of entering that plea and we're right on the cusp of that," "I'd
make a verbal motion on his behalf at this time to toll that time period and then we
would buttress that with—with a written motion, after we look into whether there
are in fact grounds." R. 315:4. The trial court agreed to Defendant's request and set
the State's response accordingly. R. 315:4-5.
After a recess, during which the parties met with the court in chambers, the
court recalled the matter on the record, explaining that "[t]he State requested time to
make a motion and so that's why we're back." R. 315:7. As part of that motion, the
State noted that, under Utah's plea withdrawal statute, Defendant "needs leave of
the Court and he must make a showing as to why his plea is not knowing and
voluntary." R. 315:8. Thus, the State asked the court "to ask the defendant for a

11

good faith basis on why he believes he has the right at this juncture to withdraw his
plea and what the basis for that is." R. 315:9.
Defense counsel objected to the State's request because "having [Defendant]
express the foundation for his desire to withdraw his guilty plea is something of a
legal argument for which he's not trained." Id. According to counsel, "it would be a
more prudent course to actually allow him, with the aid of counsel, to go through all
the documentation that was signed on the date the plea was entered, to actually
review all of the information, including the —the transcript and the record on that
date and establish grounds, if any in fact do exist" Id. Defense counsel stated that,
after speaking with Defendant, he was "not exactly sure what the foundation of [his]
argument would be," and, thus, "at this time, I'm not prepared to argue a motion to
withdraw" and would request "time, with the aid of counsel, [for him] to prepare a
formal motion, if, in fact, one is warranted in this case." R. 315:10.
The State again objected, asserting that "[w]e don't believe there is any good
faith reason for him to withdraw his plea." R. 315:10.
The court ruled that it would "require [Defendant] to give me a good faith
basis on which he is withdrawing his plea, by telling me in some way or another
and then if— if it rises even to a level of a good faith basis, then we'll go with the
times that we previously discussed this morning and —to allow you more time to
12

address this on a legal basis." "But," the court added, "either he has a good faith
basis to show that his plea was not made knowingly and voluntarily or he doesn't.
If he does, then I'll certainly allow the defense time to move forward and flesh it out
and put it into [a] more legal format, but certainly, without even the basis of that,
I'm not going to proceed." R. 315:11.
The trial court then gave defense counsel time to consult with Defendant
before asking again that Defendant "articulate for the record why it is that you feel
that your plea was not made knowingly and voluntarily." R. 315:12. Defendant
stated that while reading the paperwork supporting his plea, "the wording was
changed to where I did not knowingly or intentionally cause the death of this girl,"
and "I signed that." R. 315:13. "Then, upon standing in front of you, you told me
that it was knowingly and I may have misunderstood between those two, but I did
not intentionally cause the death of this girl." Id.
After giving Defendant time to review both documents submitted during the
plea hearing, the court asked, "Is there anything in there that you think was
changed or you didn't read through or that I didn't talk to you about at the time I
took your plea?" R. 315:18-19. Defendant responded, "I don't believe so, your
Honor." R. 315:19.

13

When Defendant was asked whether he remembered the court reviewing
with him "every single paragraph" of the Notice of Plea Bargain Rule 11
Waiver/Statement of Facts at the plea hearing, Defendant responded, "[vjaguely,
sir/' R. 315:14. When the court asked Defendant whether, at the time he entered his
plea, he said he did intentionally or knowing cause Tiffany's death, Defendant
responded, "Apparently so." Id. Defendant also "vaguely remember[ed]" telling
the court on the date of the plea that he understood the elements of the charge to
which he had plead. R. 315:15. And Defendant did not challenge the trial court's
memory that, when he entered his plea, Defendant told the court that he understood
the elements of the crime and admitted that he intentionally and knowingly caused
Tiffany's death. R. 315:19-21. Indeed, when asked, "Would you believe me if I told
you that's what you told me when I asked you," Defendant responded, "Yes. I
would." R. 315:19-21.
The trial court denied Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea: "I find
that Mr. Ferretti has not been able to articulate a good faith basis as to why his plea
was not knowingly and voluntarily made at the time." R. 315:21. Moreover, "I
made that finding at the time you entered it and I'm making it again today, that
there's no basis whatsoever for you to show that it was not made knowingly and
voluntarily." R. 315:22. The trial court then proceeded to sentencing. R. 315:22.
14

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I. Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it
denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant argues that the court
should have granted his motion because, at the plea hearing, the court "never asked
the question whether he understood that by pleading guilty he was admitting to all
the elements of the crime/ , Thus, according to Defendant, "[w]hen he pled guilty he
did not realize that he was admitting that he knowingly or intentionally caused the
death of Ms. Jarmon." Aplt. Br. at 17-18.
To withdraw a guilty plea, a defendant must show that his plea was not
knowing or voluntary. In this case, both the documents Defendant signed before
entering his plea and the court's colloquy with Defendant at the plea hearing
establish that Defendant understood that he was pleading guilty to intentionally or
knowingly killing Tiffany Jarmon. Defendant's responses to the trial court's
questioning at the withdrawal hearing do nothing to undermine that conclusion.
Point II.

Defendant claims that the trial court violated his rights to counsel

and due process when it required him to argue his motion to withdraw instead of
granting a continuance to allow counsel additional time to prepare the motion.
To the extent Defendant's right to counsel claim rests on the trial court's
conduct of the plea withdrawal hearing, at no point did the trial court refuse
15

counsel's participation at that hearing. Rather, counsel simply stated he had
nothing to say. And Defendant cites no legal authority holding that, under such
circumstances, a trial court's decision to require the defendant to present his motion
constitutes the denial of counsel.
To the extent Defendant's right to counsel claim rests on the trial court's
decision not to grant a continuance, Defendant cites no legal authority addressing
the circumstances under which the denial of a continuance constitutes a denial of
counsel. In particular, Defendant fails to cite well-established case law holding that
the trial court has broad discretion in ruling on continuances, and that its rulings
will not be reversed absent a showing of prejudice. Moreover, where Defendant
does not identify a single new ground for withdrawal that counsel would have
raised had a continuance been granted, Defendant has not shown that he was
prejudiced by the trial court's ruling.
Defendant's due process claim also fails. To the extent his claim rests on the
trial court's conduct of the plea withdrawal hearing, the record does not support
any contention that the trial court denied Defendant his right to be heard on the
claim he raised. To the extent Defendant's claim rests on the trial court's denial of
his continuance motion, Defendant cites no legal authority addressing the
circumstances under which the denial of a continuance constitutes a denial of due
16

process. In particular, Defendant fails to cite well-established case law holding that
the trial court has broad discretion in ruling on continuances, and that its rulings
will not be reversed absent a showing of prejudice. Moreover, where Defendant
does not identify a single new ground for withdrawal that counsel would have
raised had a continuance been granted, Defendant has not shown that he was
prejudiced by the trial court's ruling.
Point III. Defendant claims that this Court should allow him to withdraw his
plea because, according to Defendant, the State failed to timely send a letter to the
parole board, as promised in the plea agreement. In support of his claim, however,
Defendant relies only on evidence outside the record on appeal. Because this Court
does not consider extra-record evidence on appeal, this Court must reject his claim.
ARGUMENT
I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING DEFENDANTS MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS
GUILTY PLEA, WHERE THE RECORD SHOWS THAT
DEFENDANT UNDERSTOOD HE WAS ADMITTING TO
INTENTIONALLY OR KNOWINGLY KILLING HIS VICTIM
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant argues that the court should have
granted his motion because, at the plea hearing, the court "never asked the question
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whether he understood that by pleading guilty he was admitting to all the elements
of the crime/ , Aplt. Br. at 17-18. Thus, according to Defendant, "[w]hen he plead
guilty he did not realize that he was admitting that he knowingly or intentionally
caused the death of Ms. Jarmon." Id. The record rebuts Defendant's claim.
A, To withdraw a guilty plea, Defendant must show that the plea was
not knowingly or voluntarily entered.
Defendant acknowledges that "'[t]he withdrawal of a plea of guilty is a
privilege, not a right.'" Aplt. Br. at 16 (quoting State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040,104042 (Utah 1987)). However, Defendant cites case law holding that "'a presentence
motion to withdraw a guilty plea should, in general, be liberally granted/" Id.
(quoting Gallegos, 738 P.2d at 1040-42). Thus, according to Defendant, although the
party "'who would set a plea aside has the burden of proving that there is a legal
ground for doing so/" id. (quoting Gallegos, 738 R2d at 1040-42), that burden " 'is
relatively low in a presentence setting/" id. (quoting State v. Ruiz, 2009 UT App 121,
111, 210 P.3d 955).
But even under the case law Defendant cites, a defendant must at least
present "'a fair and just reason for granting leave to withdraw the plea/" Ruiz, 2009
UT App 121, \ 11 (quoting Gallegos, 738 P.2d at 1042). Defendant here presented no
such reason. Despite his contention otherwise, see Aplt. Br. at 17-18, a review of the
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plea hearing establishes both that Defendant understood the elements of the crime
to which he was pleading and that Defendant understood that, by pleading guilty,
he was admitting that his conduct met those elements.
"Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure governs the entry of guilty
pleas." State v. Cornell, 2005 UT 28, % 11,114 P.3d 569. Under rule 11, the trial court
bears the burden "to 'personally establish that the defendant's guilty plea is truly
knowing and voluntary and establish on the record that the defendant knowingly
waived his or her constitutional rights/" Id. (quoting State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, %
11, 22 P.3d 1242). The objective "is to ensure that defendants know of their rights
and thereby understand the basic consequences of their decision to plead guilty."
Visser, 2000 UT 88,111.
Once a guilty plea has been accepted, however, it "may be withdrawn only
upon leave of the court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily
made. v Utah Code Arm. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (West Supp. 2010); see also State v. Merrill,
2005 UT 34, t 45,114 P.3d 585 ("The right to seek withdrawal of a guilty plea is
granted by statute."). This is the same standard necessary to prove that a plea is
unconstitutional. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) ("[Ijf a
defendant's guilty plea is not equally voluntary and knowing, it has been obtained
in violation of due process and is therefore void."). And neither the United States
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nor the Utah constitutions requires strict compliance with rule 11 in order for a plea
to be voluntary and knowing. See Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988,992 (Utah 1993).
Indeed, in 2005, rule 11 itself was amended to provide that" [a]ny variance from the
procedures required by this rule which does not affect substantial rights shall be
disregarded/7 Utah R. Crim. P. 11(1).
Thus, while "[a] strict [rule 11] compliance violation . . . almost certainly
constitute [d] an abuse of discretion" in denying a withdrawal motion before 2005,
Aplt. Br. at 18 (citing State v. Lovell, 2010 UT 48, 661 Utah Adv. Rep. 20), a rule 11
violation now constitutes an abuse of discretion only if that violation rendered the
defendant's plea unknowing and involuntary. See Lovell, 2010 UT 48, ^f 81 (holding
that "from the period of time following Gibbons [i.e., the court's adoption of the strict
compliance rule] until rule 11 was amended in 2005 to incorporate harmless error
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review, a trial court's failure to strictly comply with rule 11(e) is an error that
requires reversal").2
Thus, to warrant withdrawal of his 2009 plea, Defendant "must show that the
guilty plea was in fact not knowing and voluntary." Id/, see also Moench v. State, 2004
UT App 57, f 16, 88 P.3d 353. To show that a guilty plea was unknowing or
involuntary, Defendant must show either that he "[did] not understand the nature
of the constitutional protections that he [was] waiving" or that "he [had] such an
incomplete understanding of the charge that his plea cannot stand as an intelligent
admission of guilt." Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 n.13 (1976) (citations
omitted). Where, as here, Defendant makes his claim under only the second part of
this test, his claim succeeds only if he can show that he did not "possess[] an
understanding of the law in relation to the facts." Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,
243 (1969) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

2

Although the supreme court in Lovell inconsistently suggested that a trial
court's failure to advise a defendant of his constitutional rights under rule 11(e)
renders his plea unknowing and involuntary, see Lovell, 2010 UT 48, ^ 69-70, the
State has petitioned for rehearing on that issue. In any case, Defendant here does
not claim that the trial court failed to advise him of his constitutional rights under
rule 11(e). Rather, he claims only that he did not understand that he was admitting
that he intentionally and knowingly killed Tiffany Jarmon when he entered his plea
and, therefore, that his plea was unknowing and involuntary. The quoted part of
Lovell, therefore, has no application to this case.
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Finally, a court considering such a claim is not limited to the record of the
plea hearing. See State v. Cornell, 2005 UT 28, f t 11-13,114 P.3d 569 ((holding that,
even in rule 11 cases, courts may consider plea hearing transcript, plea affidavits,
and other documents in record); see also Utah R. Crim. P. 11(1) ("Compliance with
this rule shall be determined by examining the record as a whole/').
B, Defendant has not shown that his plea was not knowing and
voluntary.
Defendant claims that the trial court should have granted his motion to
withdraw because the trial court at the plea hearing failed to ensure that he
understood "the plea [was] an admission of all [the] elements" of murder. Aplt. Br.
at 17-18 (citing Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4)(A)). Thus, Defendant asserts, "[w]hen he
pled guilty he did not realize he was admitting that he knowingly or intentionally
caused the death of Ms. Jarmon." Aplt. Br. at 18. The record from the plea hearing
refutes Defendant's claim.
As stated, in connection with his plea, Defendant signed a Notice of Plea
Bargain Rule 11 Waiver/Statement of Facts (Notice). R. 288-96. Paragraph 1 of the
Notice defined the elements of murder as: "on or about October to November 2008,
the defendant intentionally or knowingly ca[u]sed the death of another, to wit,
Tiffany B. Jarmon." R. 289. In Paragraph 3, Defendant stated that he understood
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"that the elements of the above offense the State must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt are that [he] intentionally or knowingly caused the death of another, Tiffany
Britt Jarmon." Id. In Paragraph 9, Defendant stated that he understood that, by
pleading guilty, he was "admitting that [he] committed the crime as charged." Id.
In Paragraph 13, Defendant stated that he understood that, by entering his plea, he
would "have to admit [his] participation in committing the crime." R. 292.
Defendant's Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea and Certificate
of Counsel (Statement) stated that the elements of the crime to which Defendant was
pleading were "set forth in Count 1 of the criminal information." R. 282. Count 1 of
the information alleged: "That the above named defendant on or about OctoberNovember, 2008, (a) intentionally or knowingly caused the death of TJ." R. 1. The
Statement also stated that the factual basis for the plea was "[a]s stated in court" and
that those facts "prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty."
R. 282.
At the plea hearing, the trial court read almost verbatim all the information
contained in the Notice, confirming after each paragraph that Defendant understood
the paragraph just read. R. 314:3-11. Thus, Defendant confirmed to the court that
he understood the elements of murder to be "that on or about October to November
of 2008, that the defendant, which is you, intentionally or knowingly caused the
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death of another, to-wit: Tiffany Jarm[o]n." R. 314:4. Defendant confirmed that he
understood that, absent his plea, the State would have to prove those elements
beyond a reasonable doubt. R. 314:5-6, 8.

Defendant also confirmed that, by

pleading guilty, he was "admitting that [he] committed the crime as charged/' R.
314:9.
The prosecution provided additional facts supporting Defendant's plea,
including that "after having shot Tiffany Jarm[o]n in the head with a 9 millimeter
handgun, the defendant, after disposing of her body, disposed or tried to get rid of
the evidence in this case and after pursuing that course of action, admitted this
incident to at least two other individuals." R. 314:16. Defendant confirmed to the
court that he was "entering [his] plea because those things actually occurred." R.
314:17.
After the court set a sentencing date, Defendant stated, "Your Honor, I would
like to say that I never intended initially for Ms. Jarm[ojn to die." R. 314:19. The
court then clarified, "Did you knowingly and intentionally take her life, Mr.
Ferretti?" R. 314:20. Defendant responded, "I have trouble saying yes, I did. I was
under the influence of drugs and alcohol at the time and we were in an argument."
Id. The court then stated: "I understand that you were under the influence of drugs
and alcohol, but when you committed the act that you did by shooting her in the
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head, did you understand that that would be — that you would be taking her life?"
R. 314:20. Defendant responded, "Yes." Id.
This record establishes that Defendant understood that the elements of the
murder charge to which he was pleading guilty were that he "intentionally or
knowingly ca[u]sed the death of another, to wit, Tiffany B. Jarmon." R. 1,282,289,
295; R. 314:4. Despite Defendant's contention otherwise, this record also establishes
that Defendant entered his guilty plea knowing "that the plea [was] an admission of
all [the] elements" of murder, Aplt. Br. at 17, and, therefore, that by pleading guilty
he was admitting that he knowingly or intentionally caused the death of Ms.
Jarmon, Aplt. Br. at 18. R. 282, 291, 292,295; R. 314:9.
Defendant's claim that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his
motion to withdraw because his plea was not knowing or voluntary, therefore, fails.
IL
DEFENDANT HAS NOT PROVED THAT THE TRIAL COURT
VIOLATED HIS RIGHTS TO COUNSEL AND DUE PROCESS
WHEN IT DENIED HIS MOTION TO WITHDRAW WITHOUT
GRANTING A CONTINUANCE
Defendant claims that he "was denied his right to due process and counsel"
when the trial court denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Aplt. Br. at 2124. Defendant's arguments are not particularly clear. However, concerning his
right to counsel claim, Defendant appears to assert first that because he never
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sought self-representation, the trial court violated his right to counsel when, during
argument on his withdrawal motion, it required him "in essence [to] act as his own
lawyer in articulating a good faith basis to withdraw his plea/' Aplt. Br. at 21.
Alternatively, Defendant asserts that the court violated his right to counsel because
he "was within the time frame allowed to withdraw a plea and his attorneys[]
should have been given opportunity to prepare and argue the motion." Id. at 24.
Defendant's due process claim appears to be that the trial court denied him his
rights to notice and to be heard on his withdrawal motion "by not granting a
continuance." Id. at 23.
This Court should reject Defendant's claims/
A.

Defendant's right to counsel claims fail,
1. Defendant has not shown that the trial court violated his right
to counsel at the plea withdrawal hearing.
As stated, Defendant appears to claim that the trial court violated his right to

counsel when, at the plea withdrawal hearing, it required him "in essence [to] act as

3

Although the first sentence of Defendant's argument suggests that he raises
his claims under both "the Utah and United States Constitutions," Defendant cites
no Utah constitutional provisions in support of his claim. Aplt. Br. at 21-24. This
Court, therefore, should not consider Defendant's state constitutional claims. See
State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, f 16,164 P.3d 397 ("[W]e have repeatedly refrained
from engaging in state constitutional law analysis unless 'an argument for different
analyses under the state and federal constitutions is briefed.'") (citation omitted).
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his own lawyer in articulating a good faith basis to withdraw his plea/' Aplt. Br. at
21. This claim is inadequately briefed.
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides that a defendant's
brief"shall contain... citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record
relied on." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). Under this rule, "a reviewing court is entitled
to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a
depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and
research." State v. Gomez, 2002 UT 120, \ 20,63 P.3d 72 (quoting State v. Bishop, 753
P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus,
" [i]mplicitly," this rule "requires not just bald citation to authority but development
of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority." State v. Thomas,
961 P.2d 299,305 (Utah 1998); accord State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960,966 (Utah 1989).
In short, this Court "will not engage in constructing arguments 'out of whole
cloth' on behalf of defendants." State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 72 n.2 (Utah App. 1990).
Consequently, when the appellant fails to present any relevant authority, the
reviewing court will "decline to find it for him." State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, % 12,
69 P.3d 1278. Similarly, "[wjhen a party fails to offer any meaningful analysis, [the
court will] decline to reach the merits." State v. Gamer, 2002 UT App 234, f 12, 52
P.3d 467. This Court will simply decline to consider the claim. See State v. Sloan,
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2003 UT App 170, f 13, 72 R3d 138; State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104, f 28,48 R3d 872;
State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539,549 (Utah App. 1998).
Here, to support his claim, Defendant cites case law addressing the wellestablished principle that, as a general matter, a defendant has the right to counsel
unless he "voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently77 asserts his right to selfrepresentation. Aplt. Br. at 22 (citing State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45,979 P.2d 799; State
v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183,187 (Utah 1987); State v. Pedockie, 2004 UT App 224; 95
P.3d 1182). Based on the foregoing, Defendant argues that because he "did not
request self-representation" here, the trial court violated his right to counsel when it
"forced him to immediately set forth legal grounds as to why his plea should be
withdrawn." Id. at 23.
In asserting his claim, Defendant ignores how the proceedings unfolded
below. The trial court never precluded defense counsel from participating in
Defendant's plea withdrawal motion. R. 315:1-22. To the contrary, the trial court
asked defense counsel to explain the factual and/or legal bases of Defendant's
withdrawal motion. R. 315:10. Counsel was simply unable to provide them. R.
315:10.
It was only then—after the trial court had honored Defendant's right to
counsel—that the court sought the aid of Defendant. R. 315:11. Even then, the court
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only required Defendant to offer a "good faith basis" for his withdrawal motion. R.
315:11. The court expressly stated that if Defendant could offer a good faith basis,
the court would "certainly allow the defense time to move forward and flesh it out/'
R. 315:11. And the court allowed Defendant to consult with counsel before he
offered his basis. R. 315:12.
Defendant's three-page argument presents none of this background. See Aplt.
Br. at 21-24; see Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (defendant's brief "shall contain... citations
to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on"). Nor does the case law he
cites establish that, under such circumstances, a trial court violates a defendant's
right to counsel by asking the defendant to provide at least some minimal basis for
his motion to withdraw. See Aplt. Br. at 21-24; see also Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9);;
Gomez, 2002 UT120, \ 20; Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305; Webb, 790 P.2d at 72 n.2.
In fact, the trial court may have exceeded Defendant's right to counsel by
allowing him that opportunity, even though he was represented by counsel. Cf
State v. Navarro, 2010 UT App 302,243 P.3d 519 (per curiam) (holding that trial court
has no duty to entertain pro se motion to withdraw guilty plea when defendant is
represented by counsel).
This Court, therefore, should reject Defendant's claim as inadequately briefed.
Sloan, 2003 UT App 170,113; Norris, 2001 UT 104, f 28; Bryant, 965 P.2d at 549.
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2. Defendant has not shown that the trial court violated his right
to counsel by denying his motion for a continuance.
Alternatively, Defendant appears to argue that the trial court violated his
right to counsel when it "ma[de] him argue the motion without allowing his courtappointed attorney's [sic] time to prepare," Aplt. Br. at 23, i.e., by not granting a
continuance to give counsel time to investigate whether a basis for his withdrawal
motion existed. Defendant's claim lacks merit.
First, Defendant's right to counsel discussion focuses exclusively on the law
governing self-representation. See Aplt. Br. at 21-24. Defendant provides no legal
authority or analysis to support a contention that a trial court's denial of a
continuance constitutes a violation of the right to counsel per se. See id. at 21-24; see
also Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); Gomez, 2002 UT 120, \ 20; Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305;
Wefefc,790P.2dat72n.2.
In fact, under well-established law, trial courts have broad discretion to grant
or deny continuances. See, e.g., Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11 (1983); Ungar v.
Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964); State v. Taylor, 2005 UT 40, f 8, 116 P.3d 360.
Moreover, "[n]ot every restriction on counsel's time or opportunity to investigate
[through the denial of a continuance] violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right
to counsel." Morris, 461 U.S. at 11. Rather, "only an unreasoning and arbitrary
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'insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay7
violates [those rights]/' Id. at 11-12 (quoting Ungar, 376 U.S. at 589).
In other words, "'[t]he decision to grant or deny a requested continuance lies
within the broad discretion of the trial court/" State v. Torres-Garcia, 2006 UT App
45, f 10,131 P.3d 292 (quoting State v. Begishe, 937 P.2d 527,530 (Utah App. 1997));
accord Taylor, 2005 UT 40, f 8. Moreover, "[a]n abuse of discretion occurs [only]
when a trial court denies a continuance and the resulting prejudice affects the
substantial rights of the defendant, such that a 'review of the record persuades the
court that without the error there was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
result for the defendant/'7 Taylor, 2005 UT 40, % 8 (quoting State v. Knight, 734 P.2d
913, 919 (Utah 1987)) (additional citation and quotation marks omitted); see also
Torres-Garcia, 2006 UT App 45, ^ 10 (defendant must show "show that [he] was
prejudiced by the denial, since '[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which
does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded'") (quoting Utah
R. Crim. P. 30(a)).
To prevail on his claim that the trial court's denial of a continuance violated
his right to counsel, therefore, Defendant must show not only that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying his motion, but also "'that the denial resulted in
actual prejudice/" Landrum v. Mitchell, 625 F.3d 905, 927 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation
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omitted); accord State v. Cabututan, 861 P.2d 408,414 (Utah 1993) (rejecting claim that
denial of continuance rendered defense counsel ineffective where defendant failed
to show prejudice); United States v. DeCologero, 530 F.3d 36,79 (1st Cir. 2008); United
State v. Rinaldi, 461 F.3d 922, 929 (7th Cir. 2006).
Defendant cannot make either showing here. First, defense counsel candidly
acknowledged below that he was not sure whether a basis for withdrawal existed.
R. 315:9-10. A trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying a continuance,
where defense counsel provides no assurance that a continuance would be fruitful.
See, e.g., State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750,752 (Utah 1982) ("Where the content of the
prospective witness' testimony is speculative..., it is not an abuse of discretion to
deny a continuance/'); State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah App. 1991) ("When
moving for a continuance [at trial], a party must show that denial of the motion will
prevent the party from obtaining material and admissible evidence, that any
additional witnesses it seeks can be produced within a reasonable time, and that it
has exercised due diligence in preparing for the case before requesting the
continuance").
Second, the only basis for withdrawal presented by Defendant on appeal is
the one raised and heard below. See Aplt. Br. at 15-24. Thus, Defendant has not
identified any new basis for withdrawal that was not but would have been
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presented had a continuance been granted. See id. Absent such a showing,
Defendant cannot show that he was prejudiced by the trial court's denial of a
continuance, even if that denial were erroneous. See Morris, 461 U.S. at 11-12; Taylor,
2005 UT 40, f 8 (quoting State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919 (Utah 1987)) (additional
citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Torres-Garcia, 2006 UT App 45,110.
Defendant's right to counsel claim based on the trial court's denial of his
continuance motion, therefore, fails.
B. Defendants due process claims fail.
To the extent the State is able to identify Defendant's due process claim,
Defendant's claim appears to be that his due process rights to notice and an
opportunity to be heard were violated when the trial court denied his requested
continuance. See Aplt. Br. at 23 (quoting Becker v. Sunset City, 2009 UT App 197, f 7,
216 P.3d 367). Defendant's claim fails because he did not preserve it below and does
not argue plain error on appeal. See id. Alternatively, his claim fails on its merits.
1. Defendant's unpreserved due process claim fails because
Defendant does not argue plain error.
"Generally speaking, a timely and specific objection must be made [at trial] in
order to preserve an issue for appeal." State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, f 14,128 P.3d
1171 (quoting State v. Finder, 2005 UT 15, f 45,114 P.3d 551). "'When a party raises
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an issue on appeal without having properly preserved the issue below/" this Court
"'require[s] that the party articulate an appropriate justification for appellate
review/" Id. (quoting Finder, 2005 UT 15, \ 45). "[Specifically, the party must
argue either 'plain error' or 'exceptional circumstances.'" Id. (quoting Finder, 2005
UT 15, If 15 (quoting State v. Pledger, 896 P2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995))). If a
defendant "does not argue that exceptional circumstances justifies review of the
issue," this Court will "decline to consider it on appeal." Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229
n.5; accord Finder, 2005 UT 15, % 45.
Here, the only due process claim Defendant raised in the trial court was that
"he wasn't given due process under the, at least the Sixth Amendment, effective
right of—of counsel." R. 315:25. Thus, the due process claim he raises on appeal
was not preserved below. See id. Consequently, to raise this claim on appeal,
Defendant must argue plain error or exceptional circumstances. Winfield, 2006 UT 4,
f 14; Finder, 2005 UT 15, %% 15,45; Feldger, 896 P2d at 1229 n.5 . Because he has not
argued either, see Aplt. Br. at 21-24, this Court should decline to reach his due
process claim. See Finder, 2005 UT 15, \ 45; Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229 n.5.
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2. Defendant has not shown that the trial court violated his right
to due process by denying his motion for a continuance.
Defendant argues that the trial court violated his due process right to be
heard when it denied his continuance. But the trial court heard from both him and
his counsel at the plea withdrawal hearing. R. 315. Defendant's three-page
argument cites no case law holding that the trial court's denial of a continuance
motion under such circumstances constitutes a denial of due process per se. See
Aplt. Br. at 21-24; see also Utah R, App. P. 24(a)(9); Gomez, 2002 UT120, If 20; Tliomas,
961 R2d at 305; Webb, 790 P.2d at 72 n.2.
In fact, "not every denial of a request for more time... violates due process."
Ungar, 376 U.S. at 589. Rather, as stated, trial courts have broad discretion to grant
or deny continuance motions. See, e.g., Morris, 461 U.S. at 11; Ungar, 376 U.S. at 589;
Taylor, 2005 UT 40,18; Torres-Garcia, 2006 UT App 45, If 10. "An abuse of discretion
occurs [only] when a trial court denies a continuance and the resulting prejudice
affects the substantial rights of the defendant, such that a 'review of the record
persuades the court that without the error there was a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable result for the defendant.'" Taylor, 2005 UT 40, ^f 8 (quoting State v.
Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919 (Utah 1987)) (additional citation and quotation marks
omitted); accord Torres-Garcia, 2006 UT App 45, ^ 10.
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To prevail on his claim that the trial court's denial of a continuance violated
his due process rights, therefore, Defendant must show not only that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying his motion, but "'must [also] show that the denial
resulted in actual prejudice/7' Landrum, 625 F.3d at 927 (citation omitted); accord
Cabututan, 861 P.2d at 414; DeCologero, 530 F.3d at 79; Rinaldi, 461 F.3d at 929.
Defendant has not made that showing here. As stated, the only basis for
withdrawal presented by Defendant on appeal is the one that was raised and heard
below. See Aplt. Br. at 15-24. Thus, Defendant has not identified any new basis for
withdrawal that was not but would have been presented had a continuance been
granted. See id. Absent such a showing, Defendant cannot show that he was
prejudiced by the trial court's denial of his continuance motion, even if that denial
were erroneous. See Morris, 461 U.S. at 11-12; Taylor, 2005 UT 40, | 8; Torres-Garcia,
2006UTApp45,f 10.
III.
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE STATE FAILED TO
FULFILL ITS DUTY UNDER THE PLEA AGREEMENT FAILS
WHERE IT RESTS ENTIRELY ON EXTRA-RECORD EVIDENCE
Finally, Defendant asks this Court to allow him to withdraw his plea because
the State violated the plea agreement by "f ail[ing] to write ... in a timely manner"
the letter to the Board of Pardons referenced in the plea agreement. Aplt. Br. at 24-
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26. Defendant acknowledges that "this issue was not preserved below/' because
"[a] part of the facts regarding this issue were not discovered until after the
defendant had been sentenced." Id. at 24. Defendant therefore "asks the Court to
consider this issue under the exceptional circumstances exception to the
requirement that issues be preserved from the trial court." Id.
This Court must deny Defendant's request. The primary documents upon
which Defendant's claim relies, see Aplt. Br. at Addendum A, were never made part
of the appellate record. See Record. This Court "do[es] not consider new evidence
on appeal." Low v. Bonacci, 788 P.2d 512,513 (Utah 1990); accord In re L.M., 2001UT
App 314,116 n.3,37 P.3d 1188; State v. Vessey, 967 R2d 960, 966 (Utah App. 1998);
State v. Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285 (Utah App. 1998).4

4

Even assuming arguendo the authenticity of the documents Defendant
attaches at Addendum A, they do not establish that the prosecutor broke the plea
agreement. The plea agreement states that the prosecutor would write a letter to the
Board of Pardons stating that it should "consider the Defendant's willingness to
plead guilty to murder as mitigation in considering his eventual release." R. 292.
According to the letter attached to Defendant's brief, the prosecutor wrote that letter
on June 23, 2010, just over four months after the trial court entered Defendant's
sentence. See Aplt. Br. at Addendum A; R. 306-07. According to the April 28, 2010
order from the Board of Pardons and Parole attached to Defendant's brief, its
decision setting Defendant's initial parole hearing date for March 1,2034, "is subject
to review and modification by the Board of Pardons at any time until actual release
from custody." See Aplt. Br. at Addendum A. Thus, Defendant has not shown that
the prosecutor's letter was "untimely."
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the trial court's denial of
Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
Respectfully submitted Tanuaryo? 7 , 2011.
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Addenda

Addendum A

UNI II I) MAT I SC ONSIUUIION
Amendment VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense.

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Amendment XIV
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they
reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 2.
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according to their
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each state,
excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the
choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a state, or the
members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of
such state, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in
any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis
of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of
such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one
years of age in such state.
Section 3.
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any state, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any
state legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any state, to support the
Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion
against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress
may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.

Section 4.
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including
debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing
insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States
nor any state shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of
insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or
emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be
held illegal and void.
Section 5,
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.

Utah Code Ann, § 76-5-203 (West Supp. 2008) Murder
(1) As used in this section, "predicate offense" means:
(a) a clandestine drug lab violation under Section 58-37d-4 or 58-37d-5;
(b) child abuse, under Subsection 76-5-109(2)(a), when the victim is younger
than 18 years of age;
(c) kidnapping under Section 76-5-301;
(d) child kidnapping under Section 76-5-301.1;
(e) aggravated kidnapping under Section 76-5-302;
(f) rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.1;
(g) object rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.3;
(h) sodomy upon a child under Section 76-5-403.1;
(i) forcible sexual abuse under Section 76-5-404;
(j) sexual abuse of a child or aggravated sexual ibuse of a child under bection
76-5-404.1;
(k) rape under Section 76-5-402;
(1) object rape under Section 76-5-402.2;
(m) forcible sodomy under Section 76-5-403;
(n) aggravated sexual assault under Section 76-5-405;
(o) arson under Section 76-6-102;
(p) aggravated arson under Section 76-6-103;
(q) burglary under Section 76-6-202;

(r) aggravated burglary under Section 76-6-203;
(s) robbery under Section 76-6-301;
(t) aggravated robbery under Section 76-6-302;
(u) escape or aggravated escape under Section 76-8-309; or
(v) a felony violation of Section 76-10-508 or 76-10-508.1 regarding discharge of a
firearm or dangerous weapon.
(2) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if:
(a) the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another;
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, the actor commits an act
clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of another;
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human
life, the actor knowingly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death
to another and thereby causes the death of another;
(d)(i) the actor is engaged in the commission, attempted commission, or immediate flight from the commission or attempted commission of any predicate offense, or is a party to the predicate offense;
(ii) a person other than a party as defined in Section 76-2-202 is killed in the
course of the commission, attempted commission, or immediate flight from
the commission or attempted commission of any predicate offense; and
(iii) the actor acted with the intent required as an element of the predicate offense;
(e) the actor recklessly causes the death of a peace officer while in the commission or attempted commission of:
(i) an assault against a peace officer under Section 76-5-102.4; or
(ii) interference with a peace officer while making a lawful arrest under Section 76-8-305 if the actor uses force against a peace officer;

(f) commits a homicide which would be aggravated murder, but the offense is
reduced pursuant to Subsection 76-5-202(4); or
(g) the actor commits aggravated murder, but special mitigation is established
under Section 76-5-205.5.
(3) (a) Murder is a first degree felony.
(b) A person who is convicted of murder shall be sentenced to imprisonment for
an indeterminate term of not less than 15 years and which may be for life.
(4) (a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of murder or attempted murder that
the defendant caused the death of another or attempted to cause the death of another:
(i) under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse; or
(ii) under a reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a legal justification or excuse for his conduct although the conduct was not legally justifiable
or excusable under the existing circumstances.
(b) Under Subsection (4)(a)(i) emotional distress does not include:
(i) a condition resulting from mental illness as defined in Section 76-2- 305; or
(ii) distress that is substantially caused by the defendant's own conduct.
(c) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse under Subsection (4)(a)(i) or
the reasonable belief of the actor under Subsection (4)(a)(ii) shall be determined
from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing circumstances.
(d) This affirmative defense reduces charges only as follows:
(i) murder to manslaughter; and
(ii) attempted murder to attempted manslaughter.

(5) (a) Any predicate offense described in Subsection (1) that constitutes a separate
offense does not merge with the crime of murder.
(b) A person who is convicted of murder, based on a predicate offense described
in Subsection (1) that constitutes a separate offense, may also be convicted of,
and punished for, the separate offense.

Utah Code \nin. § 77-13-6 (West Supp. 2010) Withdrawal of plea
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction.
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of the court and
a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except for a plea held in
abeyance, shall be made by motion before sentence is announced. Sentence may not be
announced unless the motion is denied. For a plea held in abeyance, a motion to
withdraw the plea shall be made within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest.
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period specified in Subsection (2)(b) shall be pursued under Title 78B, Chapter 9, Post-Conviction Remedies
Act, and Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

UTAH R. CRIM. P. RULE 11. PLEAS
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be represented by
counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The defendant shall not be
required to plead until the defendant has had a reasonable time to confer with counsel.
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason of insanity,
or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative not guilty or not
guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation
fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty.
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the ourt
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be set for trial.
A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an early trial. In cases
other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or counsel, of the requirements
for making a written demand for a jury trial.
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill,
and may not accept the plea until the court has found:
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the
right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right against
compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury,
the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the
right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these
rights are waived;
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the
plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of
those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those
elements;
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it establishes
that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant
refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient
evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction;

(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the
minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each
offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences;
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and if
so, what agreement has been reached;
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw the plea; and
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited.
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if used, a
written statement reciting these factors after the court has established that the defendant
has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the statement. If the defendant
cannot understand the English language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been
read or translated to the defendant.
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire into or
advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea.
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw a
plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground for setting the plea
aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to make a motion under Section
77-13-6.
(g) If the defendant pleads guilty, no contest, or guilty and mentally ill to a misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence, as defined in Utah Code Section 77-36-1, the court shall advise the defendant orally or in writing that, as a result of the plea, it is unlawful for the
defendant to possess, receive or transport any firearm or ammunition, The failure to
advise does not render the plea invalid or form the basis for withdrawal of the plea.
(h)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has agreed to request
or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal of
other charges, the agreement shall be approved or rejected by the court.
(h)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall advise the
defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the
court.
(i)(l) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea agreement be-

ing made by the prosecuting attorney.
(i)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon request of the
parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement and the reasons for it, in
advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the proposed disposition will be approved.
(i)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in conformity with the
plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and then call upon the defendant to
either affirm or withdraw the plea.
(j) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defendant may enter
a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the record
the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of the adverse determination of any
specified pre-trial motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to
withdraw the plea.
(k) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to the other
requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103.
(1) Compliance with this rule shall be determined by examining the record as a whole.
Any variance from the procedures required by this rule which does not affect substantial
rights shall be disregarded. Failure to comply with this rule is not, by itself, sufficient
grounds for a collateral attack on a guilty plea.
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may not be accurate with audio recordings.)

THE COURT:

This is the time set for trial but I

understand we have a — a resolution to this case.
MR. GALLOWAY:
THE COURT:

We do, your Honor.

Go ahead, Mr. Galloway.

MR. GALLOWAY:

Judge, it's our understanding that

Mr. Ferretti will enter a guilty plea to the — to Count 1,
murder charge, Count 2, obstructing of justice will be
dismissed.
THE COURT:

Is that the State's understanding as

MR. SWINK:

That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT:

All right.

well?

Mr. Ferretti, I'm going to go through a series of
questions with you, okay?

Now, I know that your attorneys

have visited with you and that the document—I have a copy of
it, this Notice of Plea Bargain, Rule 11 Waiver and Statement
of Facts, that you've gone over that as well; is that correct?
MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

That is correct.

Okay.

And just — I ' m just going to
3

remind you, you need to, if you would, please, answer audibly
for the record, okay?
MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

All right.

Mr. Ferretti, I know that

you've read through it, but just to be thorough, I'm going to
go through it with you as well, okay?
MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

Okay.

Do you understand that the charges

against you are that you've been charged with murder, a firstdegree felony in violation of Utah Code 76-5-203, which is
punishable pursuant to 76-6-203 (3) (b) as follows:
A person who is convicted of murder shall be
sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not
less than 15 years and which may be for life and further,
according to Code, a fine not exceeding $10,000 may be imposed
by the Judge.

Do you understand that?

MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

Yes.

Do you understand that the elements of

that offense are that on or about October to November of 2008,
that the defendant, which is you, intentionally or knowingly
caused the death of another, to-wit:

Tiffany Jarman.

Do you understand that?
MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

Yes.

Do you understand that the second charge

you've been charged with is obstruction of justice, a second4

degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 76-8-306, which is
punishable pursuant to Utah Code 76-203 to a possible maximum
sentence of one to 15 years and life; do you understand that?

THE COURT:

Do you understand that also according to

the Code not exceeding 10,000 may be imposed by the Judge?
MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

Yes.

Do you understand, Mr. Ferretti, that

the elements of that offense according to Utah Code
76-8-306(c) are that on or about October to November of 2008,
the defendant, which again is you, with intent to hinder,
delay or prevent the investigation, apprehension, prosecution,
conviction or punishment of any person regarding conduct that
constitutes a criminal offense, altered, destroyed or
concealed any item or writing?
MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

Do you understand that?

Yes.

Do you understand that youfve--it has

been discussed with the State that today you will enter a plea
of guilty as follows:

One count of murder in violation of

Utah Code 76-5-203, a first-degree felony, carrying the aforementioned sentence; do you understand that?
MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

Do you understand that the elements of

the offense as I stated must be--that the State must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that you intentionally or knowingly
5

caused the death of another and that would be Tiffany Brit
Jarman; do you understand that?
MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

Yes.

Do you understand that you can be

represented by an attorney at every stage of the proceeding
and that you know that if you cannot afford an attorney, one
will be appointed for you and under — and do you understand
that Mr. Galloway and Mr. Perry have been appointed to
represent you and have so during this time period?

Do you

understand that?
MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

Yes.

And have you had enough opportunity to

visit with your attorneys in this case?
MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

Yes.

Do you feel like that they have spent

the time and effort needed to assist you in--in your defense
of this case?
MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

Do you also understand that before you

can be held to answer for these charges, you have the right to
a preliminary hearing?

Do you understand that a preliminary

hearing is designed to protect you from going to trial on the
felony charges unless and until the State presents sufficient
evidence before a magistrate to show that probable cause that
the crimes that you are accused of were committed and that
6

there is probable cause to believe that you committed them?
Do you realize that a preliminary hearing was
conducted in this case already and that you were bound over on

MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

Yes.

And do you remember that I presided at

that preliminary hearing, Mr. Ferretti?
MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

All right.

You understand that after

your preliminary hearing, you entered a plea of not guilty to
the charges; therefore, you had a right to a speedy trial and
that trial was set for today.
MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

Do you understand that?

Yes.

Do you also understand that you still

have the right to plead not guilty and that if you do plead
not guilty, you can persist in that plea?

Do you understand

that?
MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

Yes.

Do you understand that you have a right

to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury and that if you
were to stand trial by a jury, the following rights would
attend to you:
That you be presumed innocent at your trial;
That you have the right against self-incrimination;
You have the right to a speedy public trial before
7

an impartial jury;
You have the right to confront and cross-examine
in open court the prosecution's witnesses;
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defense witnesses;
You have the right to the assistance of counsel
at every stage of the proceeding;
You have the right to see and observe the witnesses
who testify against you;
That you can call such witnesses as you desire and
that you can obtain subpoenas to require their
attendance and testimony of those witnesses and that if
you cannot afford to pay the witnesses and mileage fees
of those witnesses, the government would pay them for
you;
That you cannot be forced to incriminate yourself
and that you do not have to testify at trial.
Do you also understand that if you choose not to
testify at trial, the jury would be instructed that no
inference adverse to you may be drawn from your failure to
testify?
And that the government must prove each and every
element of the offense charged against you beyond a reasonable
doubt.
A unanimous verdict of a jury is required to convict
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you and if you were convicted, you can appeal and if you
cannot afford the cost of such an appeal, the government would
pay the cost of the appeal, including the services of an
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days from the final judgment of the Court.
Now, I read a lot of rights.

Do you understand that

those rights you would have had if you went to trial?
MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

All right.

Do you also understand that

by pleading guilty, there will be no trial of any kind and
that you are admitting that you committed the crime as charged
and that you're waiving these rights, with the exception that
your attorneys will continue to assist you until the
conclusion of your case before the District Court?

Do you

understand that?
MR. FERRETTI: Yes.
THE COURT:

Do you understand under the laws of

Utah, the maximum sentence that can be imposed upon you--upon
your plea of guilty to the charge identified previously, do
you also understand that if you're on probation or parole or
awaiting sentencing of another offense for which you have been
convicted or plead guilty, that your plea in the present
action can be used to revoke any probation or parole and can
result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon you?
And I understand you are not—there's nothing
9

pending on the parole or probation; is that correct?
MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

Yes.

All right.

Do you understand that under

a plea of guilty, the Judge may ask you questions about the
offense, and I will, and that you admitted to your
participation in the crime; do you understand that?
MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

Yes.

I'm going to review the agreement that

you've entered into with the State.

The State will drop — the

State will drop all pending counts in the Information against
you except for murder.

The State agrees that sentencing can

take place at any time, at the time of your plea, which would
be today and will move the Court to impose a sentence of
incarceration at the Utah State Prison of 15 years to life.
That in exchange, the State will write a letter to the parole
board with the following language:

We would ask the Parole

Board to consider the defendant's willingness to plead guilty
to murder as mitigation in considering his eventual release.
And finally, that the State will request myself to
make the same recommendation; however, you understand that I
cannot be bound by any sentencing agreement of the parties?
Do you understand that, Mr. Ferretti?
MR. FERRETTI:

Yes.

THE COURT:

Thank you.

All right.

The factual basis of your guilty plea is
10

as follows and I want to know if you understand this and you
agree to this:

Some time in the months of October to November

of 2008, you met with Tiffany Brit Jarman and you had known
T-i-F-F^r^T? "D>--I+- Tov'rnar^ I^VT_^->~ +-r\ •'-hat date* is that ccrr9ct?
MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

Yes.

Is it correct also that during this

time, you took the life of Tiffany Brit Jarman.

You drove her

to Cache County, Utah, where you shot her in the head, in your
car, taking her life.

You then pushed her body down an

embankment next to the side of the road and fled.

Is that

correct, Mr. Ferretti?
MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

Mr. Ferretti, how old are you?

MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

Yes.

Forty-three.

And how many years of school have you

completed?
MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

Fourteen.

And you read and understand the English

language?
MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

Yes.

All right.

Mr. Ferretti, have any

threats or promises of any sort been made to you to induce you
or persuade you to enter into this plea, other than the
negotiations as already stated?
MR. FERRETTI:

No, your Honor.
11

THE COURT:

Has anyone guaranteed you that you

receive any form of leniency because of your plea and do you
also understand that any recommendations made by the State may
not be followed by myself or the parole board?

Do you

understand that?
MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

Yes.

Mr. Ferretti, do you understand that you

may request to withdraw your guilty plea at any time prior to
sentencing or forfeit the right to do so?

A motion to

withdraw your guilty plea would only be granted upon good
cause and is within the discretion of the Court.

Do you

understand that?
MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURt:

Yes.

Have you discussed this case and plea

with your attorneys as much as you would like to?
MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

Yes.

And you have no further questions of

your attorneys prior to the Court taking your plea today?
MR. FERRETTI:

I have one.

(Inaudible off-the-record discussion)
MR. GALLOWAY:
THE COURT:

Okay, Judge.

All right.

Mr. Ferretti, are you

satisfied with your lawyers' counsel and advice?
MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

Yes.

Is your decision to enter this plea made
12

after full and careful thought, with the advice of counsel and
with a full understanding of your rights?

Do you understand

that?
MR. FEPJRETTI: Yes.
THE COURT:

And of the facts and circumstances of

this case and the consequences of your plea, do you understand
that?
MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

Yes.

Are you under the influence of any drugs

or medications or intoxicants?
MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

No.

You have no mental reservations

regarding your plea?
MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

No.

You're doing this of your own free will

and choice?
MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

Very well.

Does the State — is there anything else the State
would like me to review?
MR. SWINK:

I!d just like to make a record, your

Honor, that the defendant has reviewed the document you just
read to him with his attorneys and further, also filled out a
waiver form which has been signed by the defendant and the
State and his counsel as well.
13

WeTd like to make that part of

the record.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Mr. Ferretti, you have another

document in front of you there called the Statement of
D6f6ndu.rit.

Have you had a chance to QO through that document

with your attorney as well?
MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

Yes.

This one goes over the same things that

I just went over with you on the record, but you've had an
opportunity to visit with your attorney about this case—or
about this — or excuse me, this particular document?
MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

Yes.

And is this your signature on the--on

the back page?
MR. FERRETTI:
MR. SWINK:

Yes, sir.

Judge, we have one final request.

defendant has reviewed the document you have.

The

Wefd ask the

Court to sign that document and counsel for both the State and
the defendant and the defendant as well.
THE COURT:

Counsel has already signed this document

and it looks like the State has as well.
Mr. Ferretti, I find that your guilty plea has been
made freely and voluntarily and I hereby accept your guilty
plea.

To further document that, I'm signing off on the

Statement of Defendant and entering that into the record at
this time.
14

In addition to that, I'm also entering the Notice
Plea Bargain, Rule 11 Waiver, Statement of Facts as well.
MR. GALLOWAY:
ourselves.

Judge, before we get ahead of

I think that he formally needs to--to enter gui

on the record.

I don't know that he actually--

THE COURT:

Very well.

Hold on one second.

Actually, I need the copy, do you have the signed
copy of the Notice of Plea Bargain?
MR. SWINK:

No.

And thatfs--that's what I was

requesting, your Honor, if we could sign that at this time.
All parties.

We have reviewed it, we have not all signed i

THE COURT:

Okay.

Is this the only copy you have

the one you gave to me?
MR. SWINK:

No.

We have one more.

THE COURT:

Well, I don't know if I made notes on

so much as--yeah, I did make notes on it.
MR. SWINK:

We have a copy here, Judge.

THE COURT:

All right.

Mr. Ferretti, while they're filling out those
things, I'm going to ask you the question.

To the charge o

murder, a first-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
76-5-203, how do you plead, guilty or not guilty?
MR. FERRETTI:

Guilty.

THE COURT:

Thank you.

MR. SWINK:

Judge, we would also ask, after the
15

Court takes that plea, to give an oral factual basis to the
charge as well (inaudible).
Mr. Swink, would you like to do that?
IJ.IV.
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Judge, in addition to what the Court has reviewed
with the defendant, the State would add to that that the
defendant, after committing—
THE COURT

Hold on.

THE CLERK

(Inaudible) by the mike, please.

MR. SWINK

Is that working?

Or do you want me to

move to the microphone, your Honor?
THE CLERK:

(Inaudible)

MR. SWINK:

Okay.

THE COURT:

Is that working?

Go ahead.
MR. SWINK:

In addition to what the Court reviewed

with the defendant, your Honor, that somewhere between October
and November of 2008, after having shot Tiffany Jarman in the
head with a 9 millimeter handgun, the defendant, after
disposing of her body, disposed or tried to get rid of the
evidence in this case and after pursuing that course of
action, admitted this incident to at least two other
individuals, Robert Underwood in Colorado, he admitted that he
shot Tiffany Jarman in the head and disposed of her body, and
had also told him that he had mentioned this to another friend
16

of his.
The State would also, if this were to have gone to
trial, in addition to Mr. Underwood's testimony that the
^ofonrianf "h^r\ rrr\mc* +- r\ iri o horn0 in Color^d^ anrj had admitted to
him the facts of this case, he further admitted to an inmate
at the Cache County Jail the same facts in this case; that he
had shot Ms. Jarman in the head, disposed of her body and
tried to get rid of the evidence in this case.
In addition to that, he also admitted to this inmate
that he had told Robert Underwood and considered taking his
life as well, since he had told him about the incident.
Those would be the facts we would put forth at
trial.
THE COURT:

All right.

And Mr. Ferretti, as I've already gone over with you
in the—in the Rule 11 Waiver and that Statement of Facts,
you're entering your plea because those things actually
occurred; is that correct?
MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

Yes.

All right.

Thank you.

Mr. Ferretti, you do have the right to be sentenced
in no less than two or no more than 45 days.

As I've stated

to you earlier, you can waive that right if you do--if you
want to and be sentenced today.

By so waiving it, you're

waiving your right to withdraw your plea.
17

Do you understand

that?
MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

And would you like to move forward with

MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

Yes.

No, your Honor.

Okay.

Let's set—We need to set it for

sentencing.
THE CLERK:

On a law and motion setting or a special

THE COURT:

A special setting.

THE CLERK:

February 23rd at 9:00 a.m.

MR. PERRY:

That's not good for me.

MR. SWINK:

That would work fine for the State, your

THE COURT:

It's—it's problematic for Mr. Perry.

setting?

Honor.

Come closer this way instead of —
THE CLERK:

February 10th, 9:30.

MR. SWINK:

Judge, the discussions I've had, A P & P

is requesting eight weeks.

They could do it as few as six

weeks, that's the report that we've got from their office this
morning.
THE COURT:

Well, it needs to be done within the 45

days .
MR. LINTON:
THE COURT:

They'll get—they'll get it done then.
The 10th, fine?
18

It's less time than they would like, I know, but
that's the time we're going to set it.
All right.

Is there anything else from either

From the State?
MR. SWINK:

No, your Honor.

Not at this time.

THE COURT:

Anything else you want me to go over?

MR. SWINK:

No.

THE COURT:

All right.

The Court's been thorough.

Thank

you,

Anything else from defense counsel?
MR. GALLOWAY:
the sentencing on that?
THE COURT:

How--how long did we set aside for
Just out of curiosity.

As long as you need.

MR. GALLOWAY:

Okay.

So, we've got the morning or

whatever we need?
THE COURT:

How much time did you set?

THE CLERK:

I've got — there is a 10:00 o'clock

motion hearing, but I can move it.
THE COURT:

We—you can have the morning.

MR. GALLOWAY:
THE COURT:

Very well.

Thank you, Judge.

Okay.

MR. FERRETTI:

Your Honor, I would like to say that

I never intended initially for Ms. Jarman to die and I
apologize to the family and--and to the State for any troubles
19

that I've caused, and grief.
THE COURT:

Did you knowingly and intentionally take

her life, Mr. Ferretti?
MR, FERR.ETTI:

I have trouble ss,rinrr u6S

I did.

I

was under the influence of drugs and alcohol at the time and
we were in an argument.
THE COURT:

Mr. Ferretti, I understand that, but by

so stating and we've already gone over all this, but I'm going
to go over it again, in order for me to accept your plea, I
understand that you were under the influence of drugs or
alcohol, but when you committed the act that you did by
shooting her in the head, did you understand that that would
be~-that you would be taking her life?
MR. FERRETTI:

Yes.

THE COURT:

All right.

All right.

We'll continue to accept your plea.

Anything else?
MR. SWINK:

No, your Honor.

THE COURT:

All right.

MR. GALLOWAY:

Thank you.

Thank you, Judge.

(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)
* * *
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Addendum C

JAMES SWINK, 7998
CACHE COUNTY ATTORNEY
199 North Main Street
Logan, Utah 84321
TELEPHONE: (435) 755-1868

IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

NOTICE OF PLEA BARGAIN
RULE 11 WAIVER/STATEMENT
OF FACTS

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No.
ROBERT W. FERRETTI
Judge Kevin Allen
Defendant.

I hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been advised of, and that I understand the
following facts and rights, and that I have had the assistance of counsel in reviewing, explaining
and completing this form:
1. The nature of the charges against me have been explained. As explained, I am charged
with the crime(s) in Cache County as follows:
A. Murder, a First Degree Felony, 76-5-203 UCA, which is punishable pursuant to
76-6-203 (3)(b), as follows: A person who is convicted of murder shall be
sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term of noi less than 15 years and
which may be for life. Further pursuant to UCA 76-3-301 a fine not exceeding
$10,000 may be imposed by the judge.
1

a.

The elements of this offense, pursuant to UCA 76-5-203 are that on
or about October to November 2008, the defendant intentionally or
knowingly cased the death of another, to wit, Tiffany B. Jarmon.

B.

Obstruction of Justice, a Second Degree Felony, 76-8-306, which is
punishable pursuant to UCA 76-203 to a possible maximum sentence of 1
to 15 years in prison, and pursuant to UCA 76-3-301 a fine not exceeding
$10,000 may be imposed by the judge.
a.

The elements of this offense, pursuant to UCA 76-8-306(c) are that
on or about October to November 2008, the defendant, with intent
to hinder, delay, or prevent the investigation, apprehension,
prosecution, conviction, or punishment of any person regarding
conduct that constitutes a criminal offense altered destroyed or
concealed any item or thing.

2. It has been discussed with the State that I will enter a plea of guilty as follows:
One count of Murder 76-5-203 a first degree felony carrying the aforementioned
sentences.
3. I understand that the elements of the above offense the State must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt are that I intentionally or knowingly caused the death of another, Tiffany
Britt Jarmon.
4. I know that I can be represented by an attorney at every stage of the proceeding, and I
know that if I cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed to represent me. I am being
represented by Bryan Galloway and David Perry, Attorneys at Law.
2

5. I know that before I can be held to answer these charges, I have the right to a
preliminary hearing. I understand that a preliminary hearing is designed to protect me
from going to trial on the felony charges unless and until the State presents sufficient
evidence, before a magistrate, to show probable cause that the crimes I am accused of were
committed and that is probable cause to believe that I committed them. I realize that a
preliminary hearing was conducted in this case and I was bound over to answer these
charges.
6. I understand that after my preliminary hearing. I can entered a plea of not guilty to the
charges. Thereafter I had a right to a speedy jury trial. My trial was set for January 11,
2009.
7. I know also know that I have the right to plead not guilty, and I further know that if I
do plead not guilty, I can persist in that plea.
8. I know that I have a right to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury, and that if I were
to stand trial by a jury:
a) I will be presumed innocent at my trial
b) The right against self incrimination
c) The right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury
d) The right to confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution's
witnesses
e) The right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses
f) I have a right to the assistance of counsel at every stage of the proceeding;
g) I have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testify against me;

3

h) I can call such witnesses as I desire, and I can obtain subpoenas to require the
attendance and testimony of those witnesses. If I cannot afford to pay the witness
and mileage fees of those witnesses, the government will pay them;
e) I cannot be forced to incriminate myself and I do not have to testify at any trial;
f) If I do not want to testify, the jury will be told that no inference adverse to me
may be drawn from my failure to testify;
g) The government must prove each and every element of the offense(s) charged
against me beyond a reasonable doubt;
h) A unanimous verdict of a jury is required to convict me;
i) If I were to be convicted, I can appeal, and if I cannot afford the cost of such an
appeal, the government will pay the cost of the appeal, including the services of
appointed counsel and I can take an appeal within 30 days from the final judgment
of the court.
9. I understand that by pleading guilty there will be no trial of any kind, and that I am
admitting that I committed the crime as charged AND I AM WAIVING THESE RIGHTS
WITH THE EXCEPTION THAT MY ATTORNEYS WILL ASSIST ME UNTIL THE
CONCLUSION OF MY CASE BEFORE THE DISTRICT COURT.

11. I know, under the laws of Utah, the maximum sentence that can be imposed upon my
plea of guilty to the charge identified on Page 1 of this Agreement. I also know that if I
am on probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing upon another offense for which I have

been convicted or plead guilty, my plea in the present action can be used to revoke my
probation or parole, and can result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon me
consistent with that revocation or any other pending criminal case for which I may be
sentenced.
13.1 know that under a plea of guilty the judge may ask me questions about the offense,
and that I will have to admit my participation in committing the crime.
14. The Agreement which has been entered into with the State is:
A. The State will drop all pending counts in the information except Murder;
B. The State agrees that sentencing can take place at the time of my plea is taken,
and will move the Court to impose a sentence of incarceration in the Utah State
Prison of 15 years to life.
C. That in exchange the State will write a letter to the parole board with the
following language: We would ask the Parole Board to consider the Defendant's
willingness to plead guilty to murder as mitigation in considering his eventual
release.
D. The State will request the judge to make the same recommendation; however, I
understand that the judge cannot be bound by any sentencing agreement between
the parties.

*

*

*

*
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The Factual Basis for My Guilty Plea is as follows:
1, Sometime in the months of October to November, 2008,1 met with Tiffany Britt
Jarmon. I had known Tiffany Britt Jarmon prior to this date:
2. That during this time I took the life of Tiffany Britt Jarmon. I drove her to Cache
County Utah, where I shot her in the head in my car, taking her life. I then pushed her body down
an embankment next to the side of the road and fled.
*

*

*

*

I make the following representations to the Court:
1.

That I am Hf

years of age, and have completed fgh

years of public school and

2

year(s) of post high school education. I read and understand the English language.
2.

No threats or promises of any sort have been made to me to induce me or to persuade me
to enter this plea other than the negotiations set forth in this document.

3.

No one has guaranteed me that I would receive any form of leniency because of my plea,
and I understand that any recommendations made by the state may not be followed by the
judge or the parole board.

4.

I understand that I may request to withdraw my guilty plea any time prior to sentencing or
forfeit the right to do so. A motion to withdraw a guilty plea will only be granted upon
good cause and is within the discretion of the Court.

5.

I have discussed this case and this plea with my attorneys as much as I wish to. I have no
further questions of my lawyers prior to the Court's taking my plea.

6.

I am satisfied with my lawyer's counsel and advice.

7.

My decision to enter this plea was made after full and careful thought, with the advice of
counsel, and with a full understanding of my rights, the facts and circumstances of the case
and the consequences of the plea. I was not under the influences of any drugs, medication
or intoxicants when the decision to enter the plea was made and I am not now under the
influence of any drugs, medication or intoxicants.

8.

I have no mental reservations concerning this plea.
DATED this

/ /

day of January, 2010.

ROBERT FERRETTI
Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY
I certify that I am the attorney for ROBERT FERRETTI, the Defendant above and that I
know he has read the statement or that we have read it to him and I have discussed it with him and
believe that he fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically
competent to enter this plea. To the best of my knowledge and belief after an appropriate
investigation, the elements of the crime and the factual synopsis of the Defendant's criminal
conduct are correctly stated and these, along with the other representations and declarations made
by the Defendant in the foregoing Affidavit are accurate and true.
DATED this _M_

day of January, 2010.

DAVID PERRY y ^
Attorney for Defendant

BRJAN GALLOWAY
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF COUNTY ATTORNEY
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against ROBERT FERETTI
the Defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of the Defendant and find that the declaration,
including the elements of the offense of the charge are true and correct. No improper
inducements, threats or coercion to encourage a plea have been offered Defendant. The plea
negotiations are fully contained in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as
supplemented on the record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the
evidence would support the conviction of Defendant for the offense for which the plea is entered
and acceptance of the plea would serve the public interest.
DATED this / ^

day of January, 2010

SWINK
Cache County Attorney
LMES

ORDER
The signature of the Defendant was acknowledged in the presence of the undersigned
Judge. Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement By Defendant In Advance of Plea
of guilty, the Court finds the Defendant's plea of guilty is free, knowingly and voluntarily made
and it is so ordered that the Defendant's plea of guilty to the charge set forth in the Agreement be
accepted and entered.
DHXTF TKF mTJR T this

ft

day of Tama™ 2fi 10

vre^H^^H
^ - • : - . ^

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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Addendum D

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs. _

:
:

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

:

Case No.

(tot(fexT
Defendant.
I,
(jC^^^V
i-^JL/^Tff
hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been advised
of and that I understand the following facts and rights:
Notification of Charges
t>
v

I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes:
Crime & Statutory
Provision
$iTf\
//

A.

/ Ue$/iee nunoe^

Degree
/5~

J_

Punishment
Min/Max and/or
Minimum Mandatory^

fs y/i^ -k

A?,pip

T^fl^?

/J^

B.

c.
D.

9/0)

i

I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. 1 have read it, or had it
read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty
(or no contest).
The elements of the crime(s) to which 1 am pleading guilty (or no contest) r are^

—^

I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes listed
above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the foregoing crimes).
I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute or contest) that the following
facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally liable. These
facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty (or no contest) pleas and prove the elements
of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest):

Waiver of Constitutional Rights
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights under the
constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest)
I will give up all the following rights:
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot
afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand that I might
later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed lawyer's service
to me.
2

I (have not) (have) waived my right to counsel. If] have waived my right to counsel,
I have done so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reasons:

If I have waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that I
understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty (or no
contest). I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the consequences of my guilty
(or no contest) plea(s).
J

)

D * C I)

} ^i//c/

If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is ivftjh/ HA floutoi ) fi#SZ#y My
attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences w my guilty (or
no contest) plea(s).
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial (unbiased)
jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest).
\J

Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. 1 know that if I were to have a jury
trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me and b) my
attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity to cross-examine
all of the witnesses who testified against me.
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call witnesses
if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of those
witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State would pay those costs.
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to have a
jury trial, 1 would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose not to
testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. I also know that if
I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal to testify against me.

&

Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead guilty (or
no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that 1 am guilty of the charged crime(s).
If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and my case will be set
for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each element of the charge(s)
beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous, meaning that
each juror would have to find me guilty.
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of innocence and
will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above.

1 / Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or judge, I
would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the costs of an
appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up my right to appeal
my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest).
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving u p all the
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above.
Consequences of Entering a Guilty (or No Contest) Plea
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each crime to
which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no contest) to a crime
that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving a mandatory penalty for that
crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or both.
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed.
I also know that 1 may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes, including any
restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of a plea agreement.
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run at the
same time (concurrently). I know that 1 may be charged an additional fine for each crime that I plead
to. 1 also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of
which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no contest), my guilty (or no contest)
plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being imposed on me. If the offense to which I am
now pleading guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court
to impose consecutive sentences unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive
sentences would be inappropriate.
Plea bargain. My guilty (or no contest) plea(s) (is/are) (is/are not) the result of a plea
bargain between myself and the prosecuting.attorney. All the promises, duties, and provisions of
the plea bargain, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those explained below:

Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for
sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on
the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they believe the judge may
do are not binding on the judge.
4

Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, of unlawful
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises except
those contained in this statement have been made to me.
1 have read this statement, or 1 have had it read to me by my attorney, and I understand its
contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. 1 know that 1 am free to change or delete
anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes because all of the
statements are correct.
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.
I am 7^years of age. I have attended school through the
grade. I can read and
understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been provided
to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which would impair
my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the influence of any drug,
medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment.
1 believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental disease,
defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing or from
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea.
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must file a written,
motion to withdraw my plea(s) within 30 days after I have been sentenced and final judgment has
been entered. I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I show good cause. I will not be
allowed to withdraw my plea after 30 days for any reason.
Dated this H

day of J ^ i t & i A

, 2QJQ

Defendant

Certificate of Defense Attorney
I certify that I am the attorney for.
_, the defendant above,
and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I have discussed it
with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally
and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate
investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal
conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other representations and declarations made
by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are accurate arrf true.

Attorne;

Bar No.

Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against / ^ c ^ T ^
Z?L*tsfL,f^T~-r /
, defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant and find that
the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense(s) is true and
correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage a plea has been offered
defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained in the Statement and in the attached Plea
Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe
that the evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s)
is/are entered and that the acceptance of the plea(s) would serye^the public inte

fecutmg Att<5rney

Bar No. ~7 <? <? £?
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Order
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the defendant
and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses the signatures and
finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely, knowingly, and voluntarily made.
ITIS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (orno contest) plea(s) to the crime(s)
set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered.
Dated this

IL

day of.

§r&k*t4tCOssL

^2fo£r

CT COURT JUDGE

%. ;.v"
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Addendum E

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
-0O0-

STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 091100312

Plaintiff,

SENTENCING

vs.
ROBERT WARREN FERRETTI,
Defendant.

)
-0O0-

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 10th day of February,
2010, commencing at the hour of 10:20 a.m., the above-entitled
matter came on for hearing before the HONORABLE KEVIN K.
ALLEN, sitting as Judge in the above-named Court for the
purpose of this cause, and that the following proceedings were
had.
-oOo-

DEPOMAXJMERI
= LITIGATION SERVICES
333

SOUTH RIO GRANDE

S A L T L A K E CITY, UTAH
www

84101

DEPOMAXMERIT COM

TOLL FREE 8 0 0

337-6629

PHONE 801-328-1188
FAX 801-328-1189

A P P E A R A N C E S
For the State:

DONALD G. LINTON
JAMIE M. SWINK
Deputy Cache County
District Attorneys
199 North Main Street
Third Floor
Logan, Utah
84321

For the Defendant:

BRYAN P. GALLOWAY
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C E E D I N G S

(Transcriber's Note:

Speaker identification

may not be accurate with audio recordings.)

THE CLERK:

State vs. Robert Warren Ferretti, Case

No. 091100312.
THE COURT:

All right.

This is the time set for

sentencing.
Mr. Galloway, Mr. Perry, are you ready?
MR. GALLOWAY:

Yes, Judge.

THE COURT:

The State ready?

MR. SWINK:

Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT:

All right.

Mr. Galloway, go ahead.
MR. GALLOWAY:
THE COURT:

If I could have just one second?

Sure.

MR. GALLOWAY:

Mr. Ferretti wanted to address the

Court.
THE COURT:

Very well.

MR. FERRETTI:

Go ahead, Mr. Ferretti.

Yes, your Honor.

At this time, I!d

like to withdraw my guilty plea.
THE COURT:

Mr. Ferretti, that needs to be made in a

motion, it needs to be articulated, the reasons set forth in
3

the motion.

How much time do you think you need to visit with

your attorneys to file that motion?
MR. FERRETTI:

Good question.

A week or something, I'm—I'm guessing.
THE COURT:

How much time would you like?

MR. GALLOWAY:

I don't—I haven't researched the

grounds for this plea, your Honor.

I would ask for two weeks

to do so; however, given the fact that he has 30 days from the
date of entering that plea and we're right on the cusp of that
at this time...
THE COURT:

It's 30 days or —

MR. GALLOWAY:

It is.

And I —I'd make a verbal

motion on his behalf at this time to toll that time period and
then we would buttress that with—with a written motion, after
we look into whether there are in fact grounds.
THE COURT:

All right.

Well, the defendant has the

right to make that motion and I'm going to accept the verbal—
oral motion to withdraw to be followed up by written motion.
Do you need two weeks?
MR. GALLOWAY:

I would say give us two weeks to look

at it and file such motion as grounds warrant.
THE COURT:

The motion will need to be filed by

February 25th.
State's response will be due—is two weeks enough
time for you to respond?

Okay.
4

So, the State's response will

be due on March 11th.
And we111 set it for motion hearing, give us two
hours, if you would, please.

MR. GALLOWAY:

Well, thatfs just the Friday right

before the Monday, the Martinez trial starts.
THE COURT:

Oh, yeah.

THE CLERK:

(Inaudible)

MR. GALLOWAY:
THE COURT:

That!s not good.

I don't know, just a different--

I donft want it to sit out there for too

long, so, go back, if you have to-MR. GALLOWAY:
THE COURT:

What's the 23rd?

MR. GALLOWAY:
THE COURT:

How about the 19th or the 18th?

17th?

I know it's a civil day, but what's the

23rd, afternoon, the 23rd?
THE CLERK:

(Inaudible)

THE COURT:

The 23rd is Tuesday; right?

Yeah.

Civil law and motion, whatfs--is it full?

THE CLERK:

(Inaudible)

THE COURT:

Set it, I'll—that entire afternoon.

So, the 23rd of March, Thurs--it's a Tuesday
afternoon.
Does that work for the State?
MR. SWINK:

It does, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Mr. Perry, does that work for you?

Mr. Galloway?
MR. GALLOWAY:
THE COURT:

Yes, Judge.

All right.

MR. GALLOWAY:
THE COURT:

So, do we have the dates?

We do.

Anything else?

MR. GALLOWAY:

Not at this time, Judge.

THE COURT:

From the State?

MR. SWINK:

Judge, I — I just would put on the record

that we would like to move this along as quickly as possible.
We appreciate the Court moving some things on your calendar.
We do have the victim1s mother and sister who are here and
they!ve come—one of them have come from out of State and it
is a big inconvenience.
THE COURT:

I certainly understand that and

hopefully, we can resolve this one way or the other rather
quickly.
Anything else, gentlemen?
MR. LINTON:

The only question I have, Judge, and

it's my hearing, I didn't hear when their motion is due.
THE COURT:

Their motion is due —

MR. GALLOWAY:
THE COURT:
MR. LINTON:
THE COURT:

25th of February.

--the 25th of February.
Thank you, Judge.
Anything else?
6

MR. GALLOWAY:
THE COURT:

No, your Honor.

All right.

The Court's in recess.

(Off the record)
THE CLERK:

State vs. Robert Warren Ferretti, Case

No. 091100312.
THE COURT:
previously.

All right.

We met in chambers

The State requested time to make a motion and so

that's why we're back.
MR. LINTON:
THE COURT:

Thank you, Judge.
Mr. Linton?

MR. LINTON:

First of all, your Honor, in an attempt

to try and find the gun so that it wouldn't fall into
somebody's hands, perhaps even a child, I wrote a letter to
Kim Scott.

And in all candor, I--I guess it ended up in the

pre-sentence report.
I'm going to move—I've written numerous letters of
this kind, I've never seen one in a pre-sentence report, so
I'm going to move that it be stricken from the pre-sentence
report.

I think that was a mistake.
Nonetheless, with that said-THE COURT:

Let's deal with that first, now, that

you've made--you've made that.

I'm sure you have no

objections to that.
MR. GALLOWAY:
THE COURT:

No, your Honor.

All right.
7

Well, the Court also read

that and frankly, was a little surprised that it was in there,
not sure why it was.
sentence report.

So, this is on Page 17 of the pre-

I am going to order Adult Probation & Parole

to strike that from the sentence—the pre — sentence report and—
-are they here?
MR. GALLOWAY:
THE COURT:

No.

But we'll get with them.

But they'll need to print off another

one, removing that from the pre-sentence report and file the
new and amended pre-sentence investigation report with the
Court to-MR. GALLOWAY:

We'd also move the Court not to

consider that letter.
THE COURT:

The Court did not consider that letter,

frankly, I thought it was odd that it was in there to begin
with.

All right.
MR. LINTON:
THE COURT:
MR. LINTON:

We'd make a second motion, your Honor.
Go ahead, Mr. Linton.
We believe that under 77-13, and I

don't have the full code, I think it's 13-8 or thereabouts-THE COURT:
MR. LINTON:

13-6.
13-6.

There are two prerequisites that

the defendant must show to withdraw his court (sic) . First,
he needs leave of the Court and he must make a showing as to
why his plea is not knowing and voluntary.
We did an extensive Rule 11 waiver explaining to the
8

defendant his rights, what he was waiving.

And we'd ask the

Court to ask the defendant for a good faith basis on why he
believes he has the right at this juncture to withdraw his
plea and what the basis for that is.
THE COURT:

Mr. Galloway?

MR. GALLOWAY:

Judge, in thinking through Mr.

Ferrettifs desires at this time, I think it's important — I
understand that this was set for sentencing today, I
understand people came from

great distance, things such as

that; however, I don't want to get in a rush and—and mess
this thing up as we go along.
Mr. Ferretti's expressed a desire to withdraw his
guilty plea.

He's not a legal expert, he doesn't have any

legal training or anything such as that and so, actually,
having him express the foundation for his desire to withdraw
his guilty plea is something of a legal argument for which
he's not trained.

I think it would be a more prudent course

to actually allow him, with the aid of counsel, to go through
all the documentation that was signed on the date the plea was
entered, to actually review all of the information, including
the — the transcript and the record on that date and establish
grounds, if any in fact do exist.

But I think that puts Mr.

Ferretti almost in a position to make a legal argument for
which he's not trained at this time.
MR. LINTON:

We have no objection for Mr. Galloway
9

to make that basis,
MR. GALLOWAY:

I—I, quite frankly, haven't had the

time to go through that, and I--in all candor, in speaking
with him, I'm not exactly sure what the foundation of that
argument would be with regards to withdrawing his guilty plea.
We spoke briefly, for ten minutes, in the holding cell about
the foundation and the legal requirements that are needed to
make that withdrawal of plea and I kind of explained to him
what needed to happen.

He did have some concerns about him

entering the plea, about how the plea was—was treated, about
information that's come up since the plea was entered.

But at

this time, I'm not prepared to argue a motion to withdraw the
plea, but I do think it would be a more prudent course of
action to allow him time, with the aid of counsel, to prepare
a formal motion, if, in fact, one is warranted in this case.
MR. LINTON:
We object.

Therein lies the big issue, your Honor.

We don't believe there is any good faith reason

for him to withdraw his plea.
right here.

We've got all of the documents

We--the Court knows how careful we were that day

in terms of going over the Rule 11 colloquy and that's what
we're talking about right now, we're talking about his Rule 11
waivers.

I have them here.

His rights were explained to him.

He will not be able to find a right that was not given to him
and that's why he, at this juncture, cannot make a good faith
reason why he met those two criteria, one, with leave of the
10

Court and why his plea was not knowing and voluntary.
And so we object in a continuing sense.

We donft

think there is even a prima facie, good faith reason for him
fr\
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one.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

All right.

The State is correct and—and I do

appreciate your arguments, Mr. Galloway.

I understand the

frustration that you feel in trying to assist your client,
given the fact that you just found out this morning,
apparently, as he was articulating to us that he wanted to
withdraw his plea.
Therefore, what I'm going to do is — is, at least,
require Mr. Ferretti to give me a good faith basis on which he
is withdrawing his plea, by telling me in some way or another
and then if — if it rises even to a level of a good faith
basis, then we'll go with the times that we've previously
discussed this morning and—to allow you more time to address
this on a legal basis.
But the —either he has—either he has a good faith
basis to show that his plea was not made knowingly and
voluntarily or he doesn't.

If he does, then I'll certainly

allow the defense time to move forward and flesh it out and
put it into more legal format, but certainly, without even the
basis of that, I'm not going to proceed.
11

So, Mr. Ferretti, I need to understand—
MR. GALLOWAY:

Judge, can I have just one second

before the Court-rpUT?

rr\TlT>T

.

r ^ ^ - h o n ' m l r r

(Inaudible off-the-record discussion)
MR. GALLOWAY:

Judge, I should make a point that

counsel, other counsel for defense is not here at this time.
I think Mr. Ferretti and I feel comfortable going forward
today with this hearing; is that correct?
MR. FERRETTI:

Yes.

MR. GALLOWAY:

Okay.

If I could have just one second to talk to him?
THE COURT:

Sure.

(Inaudible off-the-record discussion)
MR. GALLOWAY:
THE COURT:

Very well.

All right.

So, Mr. Ferretti, Ifm going to ask you to articulate
for the record why it is that you feel that your plea was not
made knowingly and voluntarily.
MR. FERRETTI:

During the course of--of reading--I—

I can articulate this as best as I can—
THE COURT:

And--and that's all I expect.

MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

—without any legal knowledge.

Just do your best.

MR. FERRETTI:

But reading the paperwork was getting
12

changed while I was--I was sitting there and it was-the
wording was changed to where I did not knowingly or
intentionally cause the death of this girl.
JLll^il,
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that it was knowingly and I may have misunderstood between
those two, but I did not intentionally cause the death of this
girl.

And that, I will argue
THE COURT:

!

til my day--'til the end.

All right.

MR. FERRETTI:

I do admit that I—I covered

evidence, Ifve--Ifve made a lot of mistakes in this, but I did
not intentionally cause the death of this girl.
MR. LINTON:

Your Honor, if it please the Court, may

I approach?
THE COURT:

Certainly.

MR. LINTON:

I'll show defense counsel.

MR. FERRETTI:

Your Honor, I have a question while

we're here waiting.
THE COURT:

Hold on one second.

Ask your attorney first before you ask me.
(Inaudible off-the-record discussion)
MR. LINTON:

Your Honor, this is a plea colloquy

that was prepared by the State that also the Court remembers,
read by your Honor to the defendant.

And so if I can approach

and show you Paragraph 3 right here, which has been shown to
the defendant.
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THE COURT:

Mr. Ferretti, I have —I'm looking at the

record of this Rule 11 waiver that we went over you with.
you remember that?

Do

I went over that with you in Court, went

over every single paragraph and I read it to you.

Do you

remember that?
MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

Vaguely, sir.

And I read to you the Paragraph 3, it

says, I understand that the elements of the above offense the
State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that I
intentionally or knowingly caused the death of another,
Tiffany Brit Jarman, and to that, you said yes, you understood
that and agreed with that paragraph when you entered your sen-when you entered your plea.
So, what—help me understand why now youf re saying
that you didn't do that.
MR. FERRETTI:

I really don't know how to explain

it, but beyond—they have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that I intentionally did that and I--I didn't—maybe I didn't
fully understand, but I am stating at this time I did not
intentionally and/or knowingly cause the death of this girl.
THE COURT:

But at the time you entered your plea,

you said you did; correct?
MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

Apparently so.

I also went over Paragraph 1, where I

read to you the definition of murder.
14

Murder, a first-degree

felony, and what the possible sentence would be for that.

Do

you remember that?
Murder, a first-degree murder, it's on the very
first page, it!s one of the very first things I went over with
you.

And you answered yes, you understood that.
MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

I vaguely remember that, yes, sir.

I asked you if you were on drugs that

day and you said no.
Were you on drugs that day?
MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

Did you consume any alcohol that day?

MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

No.

Nope.

You stated earlier to me, just a few

minutes ago, that—that this document that you signed was
changed as you were—as you were sitting there.

What was

changed?
MR. FERRETTI:
exactly sure what part.
THE COURT:

The wording of—I'm—and ITm not
ITd have to look at it again.

Okay.

MR. GALLOWAY:

Judge, there's a document that had

the statement of facts in it and some of the facts got
changed, I believe.
MR. LINTON:
stated in Court.

HereTs the other document.

It says, As

That's the--the only thing (inaudible)

Judge, I'll put on the record here and defense
15

counsel can correct me if I'm wrong, but the only thing that
was changed in that agreement was that the State would agree
to write a letter to the Board of Pardons, telling them of his
cooperation and—and let--yeah.

And we —and we had stricken

one other matter, but let me refer to it in the document
itself.
It was Sub (d) that we added to the agreement, and
it said, The State will request the Judge to make the — i t ' s
actually Paragraph (c) of 14 on Page 5 of this agreement.

And

it says that in exchange, the State will write a letter to the
parole board with the following language, and—and we added
this language.

We already had in the agreement that we would

write a letter to the parole board, but they wanted specific
language included, which they went over with their client and
it says this:

We would ask the parole board to consider the

defendant's willingness to plead guilty to murder as
mitigation in considering his eventual release.

That was what

was added.
We did strike Paragraph 10 which was, I understand
that by pleading guilty, there will be no appellate review of
any lawful sentence imposed.

And we all initialed that, that

was the only other matter stricken.
THE COURT:
document.

See that?

So, Mr. Ferretti, turn to Page 5 of that
Are you there?

MR. FERRETTI:

It's a different one.
16

THE COURT:
Okay.

Yeah, a different one.

Do you see that?

Apparently, there were some discussions-I'll.

.
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MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

J.
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Yes, sir.
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I'm—

Apparently, there were some discussions

previous to me even coming out on the bench regarding the—the
terms of this plea, but this, the document that you have there
in front of you, was presented to the Court as a full
understanding of the terms of your plea.
And I went over that on Page 5.

Now, you can go

ahead and take a look at it, at Paragraph (c), this is all
that I had and this is what was presented to the Court after
you signed it.

And this is the paragraph that I went over

with you in open court.

And I read this paragraph to you.

Are you unhappy with the — the letter?

Or is it Mr.

Lintonfs letter that was in the pre-sentence report?

What is

it that you!re unhappy with, about that paragraph?
MR. FERRETTI:

I don't—I donft think I have any

problem with this paragraph here.
THE COURT:
of this was changed?

Okay.

So, is it you're saying that some

That's what I'm trying to figure out.

Is this what you agreed to with your attorney, with
the State, in exchange for entering the plea that the chargeone of the charges would be dropped and that they would write
17

a letter to the parole board; is that what you agreed to?
MR. FERRETTI:

I believe that is what I agreed to,

but what I!m--what I!m trying to say, your Honor, is, I did
not intentionally cause the death of this girl.

I may have

entered into this agreement not fully understanding what it
was, but at this time, I would like to state that I did not
intentionally do that and I--I would wish to have that proved
at a jury trial.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Just so—and I--I understand what

youfre saying, but just so Ifm clear, is it--as it relates to
this Notice of Plea Bargain, Rule 11 Waiver, Statement of
Facts, and then also, you were looking at the other one called
The Statement of Defendant in Support of a Guilty Plea; did
you see that one, too?
MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

Okay.

Just so I'm clear.

You--there's

nothing in these two documents that you're stating was changed
and that you didn't agree to at the time you entered your
plea?
MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

Not that I could see at this time.

Okay.

Have you had enough time to look

through those documents?
Take your time.
So, Mr. Ferretti, you've had an opportunity to go
through both those documents.

Is there anything in there that
18

you think was changed or you didn't read through or that I
didn't talk to you about at the time I took your plea?
MR. FERRETTI:
TUT?
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When I went through and read this document to

you, every paragraph and after every paragraph, I asked you if
that was true and you said yes, including on Page 2, the
elements of this offense are that on or about October or
November, the defendant intentionally and knowingly caused the
death of another, to-wit:

Tiffany Jarman.

Do you see that at the very top?
And on that day, you said yes, that is true;
correct?
On the day you entered your plea?
MR. FERRETTI:

I'm assuming that I did say that is

correct if—if you said it, I don't remember saying that,
naturally, but-THE COURT:

Okay.

Well, if I — i f I told you that

you did say yes, you'd believe me?
MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

Yeah.

Okay.

Yes, sir.

All right.

So, then, we've already gone over Paragraph 3.

So,

turn to Page 6.
The very top, it says The factual basis for my
guilty plea is as follows, and I read this to you:
19

Some time

in the months of October or November, 2008, I met with Tiffany
Brit Jarman.

I had known Tiffany Brit Jarman prior to this

date.
At the time, you said yes, thatfs correct.

Do you

have any reason to believe you said something differently that
day?
MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

No, your Honor.

Okay.

Then on No. 2, Paragraph 2, That

during this time, I took the life of Tiffany Brit Jarman.

I

took her to Cache County, Utah, where I shot her in the head,
in my car, taking her life.

I then pushed her body down an

embankment next to the side of the road and fled.
I asked you whether or not you did in fact do that
that day and you told me yes.
MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

Isn't that correct as well?

Yes, your Honor.

Okay.

And the last question I have for

you and--and I remember, and this isn't in the written record
but I remember it very clearly, I asked you if you had
anything else that you wanted to say, at the very end.

And

you said that you did and you apologized for what had happened
and said that you felt bad about it, you apologized to the
family and then you said something like, I didn't mean to.
And then I asked you, Nevertheless, Mr. Ferretti,-and I'm paraphrasing, but I'm pretty sure this is what I said,
Nevertheless, Mr. Ferretti, when you put the gun to her head
20

and you pulled the trigger, did you know that it would kill
her?

And you said yes.

Do you remember that?

It's the very

last thing we talked about.
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Would you believe me if I told you

that's what you told me when I asked you that question?
MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

Yes. I would.

All right.

Can I get my copy back of that, please?

Or the

Court--the Court's copy of the record.
Do I have anything of yours, Mr. Galloway? Any
documents?

I want to make sure I have--

MR. GALLOWAY:
THE COURT:

No, your Honor.

All right.

Is there anything else from

the State?
MR. LINTON:

We'd ask the Court not to grant leave

at this time.
THE COURT:

Mr. Galloway, anything else?

MR. GALLOWAY:

I'd just reiterate my previous-

previous motion.
THE COURT:

All right.

Noting the defense's

objection and motion, I'm going to deny that.

I find that Mr.

Ferretti has not been able to articulate a good faith basis as
to why his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made at the
time.
21

Mr. Ferretti, I understand that thereTs always
regrets, especially when you enter a plea to something as
serious as this, but at the time you entered your plea, it was
c j_ e a r LO me una u i L""you na^. ma^e it jcnowinQxy snu vo_uunuan_i_y
and after our discussion today, even though I--it's clear you
don't--you regret making the plea, itfs clear to me that you
made it knowingly and voluntarily.

And that is the benchmark

before we proceed any further under Utah Code 77-13-6 as to
whether or not you can withdraw your plea.
Your plea, having been made knowingly and
voluntarily, the find--and I made that finding at the time you
entered it and I!m making it again today, that there 's no
basis whatsoever for you to show that it was not made
knowingly and voluntarily, you were feeling well, you hadn!t
consumed any drugs or alcohol, youfd had time to talk about it
with your attorney.

I read every single sentence to you in

the—those documents and you agreed at the time.

The fact

that you don't want to do that anymore is not necessarily a
legal basis on which you can withdraw your plea.
So, the motion to withdraw your plea is denied and
we'll proceed with sentencing.
Do you need more time to prepare, like do you need
a—
MR. GALLOWAY:

No.

I'm prepared for sentencing,

Judge, the one thing I would note is, I know Mr. Perry was
22

prepared to make a few comments at sentencing, he!s not here
at this time.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:
I^Z-NTT
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He!s on his way back up right
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THE COURT:

All right.

MR. GALLOWAY:

We--

Additionally, due to kind of how this

has proceeded today, wherein, which we had the sentencing set
for 9:30 and then we came in and Mr. Ferretti made his motion
and then there was a time period between, I know that Mr.
Ferretti had some individuals here in the courtroom that were
here to support him in the sentencing and then, they, in fact,
are not aware that the sentencing is taking place right now.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. GALLOWAY:

And so, I do have some concerns that

those individuals did want to be here at that time.
THE COURT:

What?s the possibility of tracking down

those people?
I donft know, honestly.

MR. GALLOWAY:
THE COURT:

Do you know, Mr. Ferretti?

MR. FERRETTI:
MR. LINTON:

I do not.

Your Honor, the only Constitutional

right to speak at a sentencing like this belongs to the victim
and her family.

Mr. Ferretti might want to have some people

here, but by his own doing is the cause that theyTre not here
and so, I'd ask that we go ahead and move forward.
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THE COURT:

I understand that.

Nevertheless, I want to be as fair to Mr. Ferretti
as possible.

I'm going to give counsel ten minutes to just

discuss this before we proceed, see if there's anything else
that you want to put together before the Court, to see if you
can contact those individuals and let the Court know as to the
status of whether or not they're going to be here or not
within a short time.
So, we'll be back here at ten to 12:00.

Court's in

recess .
(Recess)
THE COURT:

All right.

I understand that some of

your parties have been found, Mr. Ferretti?

Is that your

understanding as well?
MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

And they're returning.

Okay.

Before we proceed, I do want to make it clear for
the record that I'm not making the ruling I did earlier
because of anything other than I found that it was not
knowingly — that Mr. Ferretti's plea was not knowingly and
voluntarily made.

Some concerns were raised in chambers

regarding the victim's family having traveled far and in
chambers, I told the prosecution that I'm not considering
that, that's not a part of what I'm considering and for the
record, I'm saying the same thing.
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That is not part of what

I'm considering, it's not part of the ruling I made today.
So, now, we're set for sentencing.
Mr. Perry?
MR. PERRY:

Your Honor, I'd make a motion to

continue sentencing at this time.

I think it's the intent of

Mr. Ferretti to file an interlocutory appeal of your recent
motion and on the basis that he wasn't given due process under
the, at least the Sixth Amendment, effective right of — of
counsel.

He lets us know ten minutes prior to sentencing that

he wants to withdraw his plea and initially, the Court gave us
time, until February 25th to file a motion to withdraw the
plea, which would have given us an opportunity to review; but
under the rules of appellate procedure, we'd ask the Court to
continue sentencing so that we can file our petition for
interlocutory appeal and see if the Supreme Court will hear
this —our argument on giving Mr. Ferretti the opportunity to
file a written motion and—and argue, after counsel has had
adequate time to prepare, review the record and—and make
meaningful arguments to the Court as to what grounds he may be
proceeding under to withdraw his plea.
And so, we'd ask for a continuance of the sentencing
on those grounds, your Honor.
THE COURT:

All right.

Your motion for continuance

is denied.
MR. PERRY:

Okay.

Your Honor, in this case, Mr.
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Ferretti—what ! s that?
In this case, Mr. Ferretti has set forth in his
statement the events that occurred, you know, on that night
and then he!s also indicated that there's a lot of things he
can't remember and maybe that shows—puts red flags in the
Court's eyes or maybe the State's eyes or if you—if the Court
reviewed the (inaudible) medical records, and I presume the
Court h a s —
THE COURT:

Uh huh (affirmative).

MR. PERRY:

--and in this matter, in—in one note,

it says, patient reports periods of time when he cannot
remember anything.

And underneath that, it says other

negative consequences related to substance abuse.
And so, that—he's admitted that — in his statement
that on the night in question, both people used
methamphetamine.

When he was in the hospital, he reports to

the doctor there that there's times when he cannot remember
anything and so that may explain, you know, why his statement
is vague and address some of the concerns that the Deputy
County Attorney has about location of the firearm or whatnot.
Anyway, we'd just urge the Court to, you know,
enforce the plea agreement.

The State agreed to write a

letter to the Board and recommend that they consider the fact
that he pled guilty as a mitigating factor in determining when
his release from prison will be.
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Also, farther, we'd--also, your Honor, we f d point
out that therefs been statements made in the report that,
especially like a Grace Brownley, when he was living there, he
provided care to her husband who was in a wheelchair.

She

indicated she never noticed anything violent about him.
In my associations with Mr. Ferretti, he's been very
cordial every time I've met with him, he doesn't have any
write-ups at the jail, he just seems to be, you know, a nonviolent person.
And so, we'd ask the Court to factor all that in
consideration in passing sentence.
THE COURT:

I'd submit it on that.

Thank you.

Mr. Ferretti, is there anything you want to say?
MR. FERRETTI:

Yes, your Honor.

When this was first

proceeding, I requested that the Court or that my attorneys,
investigator or whoever, obtain medical records from my
initial doctor, my--for my initial heart attack and those were
never acquired.

I don't understand why that is.

I know how

medical records go with getting that stuff from them, but I
just received a letter from my ex-girlfriend, last night, and
she mentioned some things in there that would possibly be
relevant to this case as far as my--my mental state goes.
And I would--I just wanted to say that.
THE COURT:

Okay.

You can articulate what those

con--those mental state concerns were, if you would like, to
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me.

You donft need your girlfriend to do that, if you want to

do that.
MR. FERRETTI:

Well, it actually—it would actually

come from the--from the doctor, but his--I don't fully
understand.

It's something to do with I came out of a coma

when — and they had to re-induce a coma and that had something
to do with schizophrenia and various other things that could
occur because of that.
I've had trouble with these different things,
anxiety, schizophrenia, hearing voices and stuff over the
years and at some time — it comes and goes.

I'm not trying to

use this as an excuse for what happened, of course, but I just
want the Court to be aware of my situation.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. FERRETTI:

Thank you, Mr. Ferretti.

And I was also — the copy of the

P.S.I, report was given to me and I did read some stuff that
apparently was not supposed to be in there.

I didn't feel

very good about some of those things that I read in there and
I don't believe that that should be addressed like that.

I

understand things are privately, but apparently, everybody is
under the belief that I am just joking with you guys about
this and nobody seems to believe my story that I am not just
some cold-blooded killer.
And I hope this is being recorded so that people can
understand how I feel about this.
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And as I stated before, I

understand that I may have made a mistake as far as this-entering this guilty plea.

I also thought that I would be

able to retract that guilty plea because I was not, at that
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have all the evidence available and the things for my proper
defense.
THE COURT:

Is that because you didn't get the

medical records?
MR. FERRETTI:

The medical records and another issue

also.
THE COURT:

Okay.

All right.

Anything else, Mr. Ferretti?
MR. FERRETTI:
THE COURT:
MR. LINTON:

No, your Honor.

All right.
Judge, first of all, I—would the Court

mind if I sat while I went through-THE COURT:

So long as we can pick you up, so make

sure you don't cover up the microphone and you speak into it.
MR. LINTON:

Judge, first of all, in response to the

defendant's assertions that the Court has seen the presentence report which contains a number of diagnoses from
individuals who were professionals in Colorado.
I'll draw your attention to some of those diagnoses,
which were never schizophrenic in nature, but they were druginduced psychosis and he was also diagnosed with
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methamphetamine dependence.
There was a psychosis, this is on another report
submitted by Timothy W. Woodward, who is a medical doctor who
diagnosed him with psychosis not otherwise specified,
probable--probable drug-induced psychosis and methamphetamine
dependence and also alcohol abuse, ruling out bipolar disorder
in that same, and both of these were subsequent to the
defendant's heart attack.
With that said, Judge, IT11 also refer the Court too
76-5-205.5 of the Utah State Code and this is relevant in this
case for this reason—
THE COURT:

I!m sorry.

What's the Code section

again?
MR. LINTON:

76-5-205.5.

A defendant cannot use that as a defense in this
instance because he voluntarily ingested methamphetamine and
alcohol, by his own admission, on this occasion and he's
attributing that to blacking out o r — o r — o r some other reason;
but that section reads, the defendant, who is under the
influence of voluntarily consumed, injected or ingested
alcohol, controlled substances or volatile substances at the
time of the alleged offense may not claim mitigation of the
offense on the basis of a mental illness if the alcohol or
substance caused, triggered or substantially contributed to
the mental illness.
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Wefd just submit to the Court in this instance that
even if the defendant is trying to rely on this mental illness
or disturbance or this drug-induced state that he could not
nave
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Furthermore, Judge, the facts do not weigh that out;
in fact, the facts in this case indicate the defendant has a
very good recollection of what occurred and I111 draw the
Court's attention, first of all, to the statement in the presentence report on Page 20 and 21.
The defendant, in clear detail, talked to his
friend, Robert Underwood, about this event and he did so on a
couple of different occasions.

The defendant's friendship

with Rob--Mr. Underwood goes back some time and you will
recall, in the preliminary hearing, when Mr. Underwood
testified and it's also in the pre-sentence report, that the
defendant called him at his home and he told him that he had
done what they had talked about during a barbecue and that is
taking someone up into the mountains and shooting them to see
if they could do it.
He admitted at that time that he goofed up and it
was just, he thought, with this friend, it was just something
they talked about, but it would never, ever happen and he said
that this was just something to talk about when we were
drinking.

Well, he told me that he had done this, but he

messed it up.

He also told me that it didn't bother him at
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all.
The defendant is a dangerous individual and this is
(inaudible) by the facts of this case as well.
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can help him out; one, his friend, Mr. Underwood in Colorado,
and another person, and I'll come back to this in just a
minute, Mr. Nathan Duros, in the Cache County Jail, where he
gives explicit details regarding this event.
He told him at that time that he was going to go out
of the country.

Later, and this is on Page 21, your Honor,

the defendant re-contacts his friend, Mr. Underwood, and Mr.
Underwood had tried to find out who had died over here in Utah
and was not able to do that by looking on line, but the
defendant ends up going to his home, they end up having some
alcohol, they drink some alcohol, heTs with him for some time
and then he opens up one evening and this is what's reported
by Mr. Underwood.
This is the night that Rob started to tell me what
happened.

He hadn't told me who he had shot, but he said that

he was to take somewhere--he was--and I'll — I'm just going to
read it as it's written although it doesn't read very well,
but he said that he was take them somewhere to shoot the
person.

He said that he didn't make it to where he planned to

do it because the person would not shut up.
He said he got tired of hear their mouth and just
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shot them right in the front seat.

He said he laughed and

said, oh, what, ainft you got nothing to say now?

And I told

him that I had been checking the web site for the Tribune and
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So, he asked me to show him the web site and when I
got on it and clicked on homicide for 2008, and showed me
Tiffany's name, there was--there was no picture.

He clicked

on her name and I read the report and things started to change
real fast.

I couldn!t believe this was happening.

I told

that back when we talked about doing something like this, that
it was someone that we never knew and now it was someone that
I knew.

I asked him if he could take it back, would he do so?

And he said no, that if he hadn?t done it, someone else would
have.

This is when I saw things for what they were.
As we continue down through that paragraph, Mr.

Underwood now starts to express some concern about the
defendant and--and him harming other individuals and he said
this:

He told me about some Mexican friend of his, that they

were talking about him shooting her to shut her up and
laughing, saying, oh, what, you ain't got nothing to say now?
And how it didn't bother him in the least and that he hadn't
lost any sleep over it.
He goes on to say that the cops tried to question
him over at his house and he had his best poker face on and-and Mr. Underwood goes on to say that this started to scare
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him and he started to feel trepidation about being around the
defendant and he was fearing for his own safety.
Now, Judge, that!s important, again, to show how
v^angerous Luis ^e±.envaant is.

»\s Know tust tac ucj.snuant/ snu

if you'll look on Page 8 of the pre-sentence report, that the
defendant also talked to Nathan Duros.

And these are

individuals who did not know the facts about this case and Mr.
Duros had no way of knowing any of the facts about this case.
He reported to police, after he was—found out what
had happened, from the defendant, having been housed with him,
that the victim and the defendant had been using drugs
together and that he shot her, in the vehicle.
And that's also supported and corroborated by the
facts of this case.

There was a large amount of blood found

in the vehicle, in the passenger side of the vehicle, that the
blood had accumulated on the floor board.

We know that a

piece of the carpet was ripped up in that vehicle, that there
was so much blood that when it was tested by the State Crime
Lab, they could see how it had pooled on the floor underneath
the carpet.
We also know that it had run down the console, had
run over the console and down onto the driver's side part of
the console.

The defendant had tried to clean that up, he had

tried to wipe down the vehicle, he had removed the passenger
side seat in addition to the carpet and the defendant went to
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great lengths to try to cover up the evidence in this case;
again, because he knew, Judge, that he had murdered someone,
he knew how he had done it.
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He didnft shoot her outside the car, he

ended up shooting her inside of the car.
He admitted to—and the defendant, Judge, seems and-and if you read his report of the events, he tries to blame
other people and sadly enough and deplorably enough, he tries
to blame the victim in this instance.
He reports to Duros that she was crying when he shot
her.

He said Robert claimed she deserved to die because she

was a crack whore.
He said she was poor and on drugs and then he talked
about how he drove to Logan and discarded the body in Logan
Canyon and later, threw the gun away in the lower part of the
canyon.
He admitted that they had had sex, but he denied
having raped her.
According to Mr. Duros, Robert told him to consult
with his brother about how to discard the evidence; so, he not
only discarded the evidence, but he talked about, to someone
else he referred to as his brother, of what he should do to
discard the evidence.
Mr. Duros also reported and this is the concern and
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this is Mr. Underwood's concern, that he was afraid and began
to be afraid for his own safety, which is real, because Mr.
Duros reported to law enforcement and this is in the presentence report, that he also had thoughts about killing Mr.
Underwood because he had told him about the events.
Again, your Honor, that goes to the defendant's
dangerousness and—and another thing that shows how dangerous
the defendant is, is the lack of remorse that he shows in this
instance.
On Page 3 of the pre-sentence report, Mr. Scott
reports that he verbalizes remorse, but there is a clear
absence of matching emotion.

His statements are without

feeling.
Just down on that page, the defendant wants to blame
other people and when he says things like this, it really goes
to how dangerous the defendant is and that he can't take
responsibility and wants to blame the victim in this case for
his acts.
He says the type--when asked what changes he needed
to make so this doesn't happen again, he stated, the types of
women I date.

He said he is a kind person that tries to save

girls.
And down below, he says he does not think his
account of that--of the event will be completely understood
and he also says, the evidence points only one way; and it
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really does, your Honor.

But for a comprehensive

investigation by the Cache County Sheriff!s Office and a
little bit of luck in that the defendant, as he was trying to
discard and get rid of the evidence, his vehicle was not
crushed and we were able to find the vehicle, which supported
the other evidence that had been accumulated by the County
Sheriff!s Office.
The defendant could have walked.

He did everything

he could to dispose of the evidence because he knew that he
had shot Tiffany Jarman in the head and caused her death.
Judge, I know the Court has read the pre-sentence
report.

We would submit to this Court and ask the Court to

sentence the defendant according to Section 76-5-203 Sub (3)
to 15 years to life in the Utah State Prison as the facts of
this case support such a sentence and the State law requires
such.

We!d ask the Court to enter such sentence at this time.
THE COURT:

Do you have anyone else that you want to

present?
MR. LINTON:

Judge, we do have the mother of the

victim, Becky—Becky Jarman, and she would address the Court
first, after which the sister of the victim, Tricia Jarman,
would like to address the Court as well.
THE COURT:

All right.

Mr. Ferretti, go ahead and have a seat over in the
jury box, please.
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MS. JARMAN:

Tiffany Brit Jarman was 33 years old,

she was funny, loving, caring and giving, but she was so much
more; she was a mother, a sister, a cousin, a niece and a
friend, but more important, she was my baby.
What Robert Ferretti did is reprehensible.
a choice that night, but not the right one.

He made

He drove Tiffany

up a canyon in Logan, ended her life and left her by the side
of a road.
He!s

It sickens me to be in the same room with him.
a coward.

I can't phantom what kind of a person, especially

one who had known my daughter for several years and fathered a
child with her, what do you say about a man like this?

I say

he's not the kind of person I want in my world or our society.
I don't want another mother to ever run the risk of having to
go through the heartache and pain that I've had to endure.
The only solace this Court could offer me today is
to promise that Mr. Ferretti will spend the rest of his life
in prison.

He took my baby, but not my memories.

I have a

daughter, still, but I have half a heart, that I will still
feel those memories, but I never feel my daughter's arms
around me, (inaudible) me, see that smile and hear her laugh
and have her

T

hisper in my ear, I love you, Mother.

Thank you.
THE COURT:
MS. JARMAN:

Thank you.
Thank you.
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First of all, I want to say, no human being should
ever be standing where I am right now, standing in front of
her baby sisterfs murderer, her only sibling that is.
j.

sister.
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Tiffany was and is sunshine, always smiling, happy, a

kind, tender hearted little girl.
loved her children and family.

She was funny, outgoing,

She only wanted to be--only to

love and to be loved.
You, you coward, took that away.

You are a monster,

a murderer and did I mention coward?
This trauma you intentionally brought into our lives
is way beyond the realm of the normal, human experience and
has turned all our lives upside down and that is an understatement.

We will never fully recover from this tragedy, no

matter how much time goes by.

You affected our lives in many

more ways than I can possibly ever count nor explain; mine, my
step-father, Tiffany's friends, countless cousins, uncles,
aunts, my mom's and her children and one of those children,
one of the children that you and Tiffany had together, I don't
think any excuse may be given to your son that you and Tiffany
had together will ever appease him.
You shot her in the head and you dumped her body on
the side of a canyon road.

It is normal for children to bury

their parents, to watch their children go on, lead their own
lives, that is a normal and joyous part of life, to walk
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through your life with your siblings, and in my case, my only
sibling, my baby sister, Tiffany Brit Jarman.
I should be sitting on a front porch with my sister,
in old age, laugh and talk and share together the experiences
we shared together through the course of our lives.

My mom

had to bring my sister, my baby sister, Tiffany Brit Jarman,
home in a box.

We never had the regular rituals that normal

human beings get to do when someone in their lives died; no
viewing, no funeral, no burial.
No matter—no mother should ever have to do that,
let alone outlive her baby daughter.

For that, I cannot and I

will not forgive you.
I can only say at this point that I wish and hope
and pray that you will spend the rest of your natural life in
prison, for as long as I!m alive, I will be at every parole
board meeting, Tcause I will out-live you and so will her
children, they will be there as well.

You will never be

released into society as long as I!m alive.
You may be able to try and shut my sister up, bur I
think the only voice that you won't be able to shut up is the
walls — or the voice that you will hear in the four walls that
you will be confined to and those walls will hear the echoes
of your screams and your cries.
Ifm done.
THE COURT:

Thank you.
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Is there anything else from the State?
Is there anything else from the State?
MR. LINTON:
THE COURT:

No, your Honor.
Mr. Perry, is the witness—the person

that came, did you want them to have — to be able to say
something?
MR. PERRY:

I guess they--she's not going to make a

statement.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. PERRY:

She—she's previously written a letter

and so I guess we'll just submit it on that letter.
THE COURT:

All right.

Mr. Ferretti, come on up.
Mr. Perry, is there anything else today?
MR. PERRY:

Well, we could go on about the

statements about Nathan Duros, about how he's a professional,
I guess, narc, so to speak, he's—he's just trying to—he's
narced on people down in Tooele and Davis County, a couple
people in the Cache County jail, and then as a Federal inmate,
has made a living out of--out of trying to provide
information.

And so whatever reliability his statement has, I

guess the Court can weigh that,
Obviously, Mr. Ferretti, when—after this occurred,
you know, he had two choices; either he could go to the police
and say it was self defense or he could try to cover it up.
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Obviously, he opted for the--the option to--to--not to go to
the police.
And I think we've presented stuff from his medical
history and his statement as to what occurred that, you know,
we'll just submit it on that, your Honor.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

All right.
MP. PERRY:

And he has been in custody now for, I

believe, about three hundred and some-odd days.

We'd ask for

credit for time served, your Honor, and maybe some
documentation supplementing the pre-sentence report as to the
restitution amount that is—is being asked for, 'cause we
really don't see that.
THE COURT:

Do you want to hold that out 30 days

based on the documentation?
MR. PERRY:

I think so, yeah.

THE COURT:

All right.

Anything else?
MR. PERRY:

Anything else you want to say, Mr.

THE COURT:

Anything from the State?

Ferretti?

MR. LINTON:
THE COURT:

No, your Honor.

We'll subrrut it,

Mr. Ferretti, it is a very solemn

occasion to sentence you today, not because I'm hesitant in my
duty to do so and impose on you the justice that the law
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requires, but because it is the end of a very long process of
justice for your victim, Tiffany Jarman.
I listened to the evidence presented at the
prej-iminary nearing and iu j^ecame Cj_ear L.O me, a j_ew unings/
first, you murdered this woman in cold blood and you thought
because she was a person of little significance of this world
that the world would not care about her murder.
you were wrong.
Jarman.

Fortunately,

Thankfully, the world did care about Tiffany

Through dedicated and relentless police work, you

were found and brought to accountability.

Through the courage

of an acquaintance, you were found and also brought to
accountability.
Now, you stand here today ready to be sentenced for
this horrendous act.

The State of Utah did not forget about

Tiffany Jarman and because of that, now, you, too, get to
remember, hopefully for the rest of your life, every day of
your life, Tiffany Jarman as well.
Mr. Ferretti, I hereby sentence you to prison for an
indeterminate term of not less than 15 years and which may be
for life.
I'm going to order that $15,360.63 be paid in
restitution, pending verification of that from the State.
State has 30 days to verify that.

The

If they don't verify it

within those 30 days, that restitution is not ordered.
I also impose a fine of $10,000 plus an 85 percent
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surcharge on you.
And Mr. Ferretti, I'm also going to recommend to the
parole board that you never be released from prison, that you
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And I?m writing a letter to the parole board

to follow up on that, encouraging them to do that.
And you will have no credit for time served.
You have 30 days to appeal this sentence.
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)

* * *
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